


# Power and Persistence: The Indigenous Roots of Representative Democracy


Supplemental information  
(For Online-Appendix)

Figure A1: Current and Indigenous Democracy across Continents: Power based on Complexity



*Notes.* The figure shows the correlation between the mean polity2-scores and mean indigenous democracy across countries by continents. Blue bars represent the entire sample with information on both indigenous and contemporary democracy and societal complexity (825 societies), while orange bars represent averages across only the powerful indigenous groups, indicated by being defined as a compact or complex settlement (376 societies). The numbers at the end of each column indicate the number of societies (countries in parenthesis) that the correlation is based on.

Figure A2: Current and indigenous Democracy across Continents: Power based on Proximity to the Capital



*Notes.* The figure shows the correlation between the mean polity2-scores and mean indigenous democracy across countries by continents. Blue bars represent the entire sample with information on both indigenous and contemporary democracy and proximity to the capital (854 societies), while orange bars represent averages across only the powerful indigenous groups, indicated by being located within 400 km of the capital city (248 societies). The numbers at the end of each column indicate the number of societies (countries in parenthesis) that the correlation is based on.

## 1. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. Summary statistics of main variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Polity IV	104	2.825	5.44	-8.143	10
Indigenous democracy	104	.266	.35	0	1
Society size	96	4.23	2.106	1	8
Share of societies with 1000 persons or more	96	.298	.38	0	1
Societal complexity	104	5.581	1.675	1	8
Share of societies compact or complex	104	.555	.363	0	1
Avg distance to capital city (km)	104	593.94	708.50	8.32	3946.28
Share of societies within 400 km of capital	104	.56	.391	0	1
Average year of measurement	104	1878.05	192.86	654.5	1957.5

Table A2. Years of measurement

Year	Number societies
Before 1800	47
1801-1850	61
1851-1860	86
1861-1870	67
1871-1880	54
1881-1890	41
1891-1900	115
1901-1910	113
1911-1920	187
1921-1930	155
1931-1940	116
1941-1950	159
1951-1960	40
1961-1970	5
Total	1246

## 2. Matching indigenous societies to contemporary countries

The analysis involves indigenous information on ethnographic societies from the Ethnographic Atlas and the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, which we match to contemporary information available at the country level. We match each ethnographic society to a current country using ArcGIS technology and a shapefile of current country borders from ESRI.com. Specifically, we match ethnographic societies within the borders of a current country to this particular country.<sup>1</sup> 1107 of the original 1265 ethnographic societies fall exactly within current country borders. The remaining 158 societies are located outside current country borders, mainly due to inaccuracy in the measure of latitudes and longitudes for the ethnographic societies. 10 of these are located more than 200 km from a current country border and we regard this as too large an accuracy and exclude them from the analysis. The remaining 148 societies are located on average 30 km from a current country border. We match these remaining societies to their nearest country.

Next, we take two approaches to aggregate the ethnographic information to the country level.<sup>2</sup> First, we calculate a simple average of indigenous proto-democracy in country  $c$  as the share of societies within that country's borders, where leadership succession is by election, formal or informal consensus. Formally,  $indig_c = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{s=1}^N indig_{sc}$  for all  $N$  societies  $s$  within country  $c$ , where  $indig_{sc}$  is a dummy equal to 1 if society  $s$  had rules for leadership succession by either "election or formal consensus" or "informal consensus", zero otherwise. The information on indigenous democracy is available for 121 countries. Note that this approach weighs all groups within a country equally; implicitly assuming that the groups in a country mattered equally for subsequent regime developments.

The second aggregation method, used in the main analysis of the paper, weighs each

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<sup>1</sup>This technique is different from that of Giuliano and Nunn (2012), who instead of location of the ethnographic society use the location of the language group to which the society belonged to. These language groups are sometimes very broad and spread across several countries. By using the location of the group per se, we do not have to assume anything about the spread of institutions within language groups.

<sup>2</sup>Note that the difference in aggregation levels between the dependent and independent variable cannot be dealt with by clustering the standard errors, since the dependent variable has the highest level of aggregation.

society by its political power. The main measures of political power used in the paper are indicator variables, call them  $I_{sc}^p$ , which is equal to one for the powerful societies, zero otherwise and  $I_{sc}^{np}$ , which is equal to one for the non-powerful societies and zero otherwise. We then calculate  $indig_c^p = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{s=1}^N indig_{sc} \times P_{sc}^p$  and  $indig_c^{np} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{s=1}^N indig_{sc} \times I_{sc}^{np}$  for all  $N$  societies  $s$  within country  $c$ .<sup>3</sup> All regressions including the "power-corrected" measures of indigenous democracy also include the fraction of powerful societies in a country,  $P_{sc}^p$ .

The main regression using the "power-corrected" measures of indigenous democracy are thus:

$$D_c = \alpha + \beta_3 indig_c^p + \beta_4 indig_c^{np} + \gamma P_c + \mathbf{X}'_c \delta + \epsilon_c \quad (1)$$

An alternative method of aggregating the data is to weigh the data with the political power of the particular ethnographic societies. This is done in Table A3 and Table A4 below, where the first column restricts the sample to the sample where the particular power measure is non-missing, while column (2) weighs the ethnographic data with the power of the particular ethnographic society using probability weights.<sup>4</sup> While precision of the estimates increases throughout, this difference is miniscule for the power measures based on size and complexity, and a bit more visible when weighting by the distance to the capital in Table A4. This is because the size and complexity measures are categorical variables, while distance is linear and more suitable as a linear weight. But perhaps more likely due to the idea that the institutions of the politically weaker societies do not persist to contemporary times at all. Note that the significance of the result weighting by the size-based power measure is simply due to the sample where the variable measuring size

<sup>3</sup>Note that the regression results using this method is equivalent to calculating only  $indig_c^p$  and including it together with the simple average from before,  $indig_c$  in the regression. The former, though, has the advantage that we can read the impact of indigenous democracy in powerful societies vs weak societies directly from the parameter estimates.

<sup>4</sup>The difference between the estimate in column (1) in Panel A of Table A3 and the estimate in column (1) of Panel A in Table 3 is due to the different ways in which missings are excluded. The specification in Table 3, column (1) throws away countries with missing indigenous information on size. Average indigenous democracy is calculated across all societies. The specification in Table A3, column (1) first throws away all societies without information on indigenous society size and then calculates the average indigenous democracy across these societies with both information on size and indigenous democracy.

is available. Alternative weights are used in columns (3)-(9) of Table A3; societies defined as weak according to the particular cutoff are given the weight 0.1, while societies defined as strong are given the weight 1. These weights are arbitrarily chosen, but the attempt is to let the weights vary non-linearly at the cutoff. Again, the increase in precision and size of the estimate is small. The last alternative method of aggregation attempts to address this.

The regression above, used throughout the main part of the paper, allows us to test whether only the powerful societies leave an imprint on national institutions, while the less powerful societies do not. I.e., that  $\beta_3 > 0$  and  $\beta_4 = 0$ . If the hypothesis is true, then including a measure of average indigenous democracy in the less powerful societies,  $indig_c^{np}$ , throughout reduces the precision of estimation. Indeed, we find that  $\beta_4 = 0$  in most regressions, except for a few of the results using complexity as a measure of power. Thus, it may be more efficient to aggregate only across the politically powerful societies, and exclude the less powerful societies from the sample altogether. This is done in Panel A1 of Table A3 using the size based power measure, in Panel B1 using the complexity based power measure, and in Panel B of Table A4 using the distance based measure. Both size and precision of the estimate on indigenous democracy increase substantially. As a placebo check, Panels A2 and B2 in Table A3 and Panel C in Table A4 restrict the sample to the weak societies based on the particular cutoff. Consistent with the results in the main part of the paper, democratic practices of these weaker societies do not persist to predict contemporary democracy at the national level.

Table A3. Alternative aggregation method using power measures based on size and complexity

Dep var: Mean polity2 1990-2010	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A. Weighting the data with the size-based power measure									
			Size of society, $c$						
			50-99	100-199	200-399	400-1,000	1,000-5,000	5,000-50,000	More than 50,000
Mean indigenous democracy	2.99** (1.34)	3.15** (1.33)	2.88** (1.29)	2.94** (1.30)	2.71** (1.35)	3.39** (1.34)	3.52*** (1.28)	3.59*** (1.29)	3.44** (1.31)
Observations	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
R-squared	0.43	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.45
Weights used	None	Linear	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1
Panel A1. Restricting the sample to strong societies using size-based power measure									
Mean indigenous democracy			3.50** (1.42)	3.89*** (1.45)	3.38** (1.59)	4.23** (1.72)	4.35*** (1.58)	5.27*** (1.68)	5.59** (2.10)
Observations			86	77	69	60	47	44	31
R-squared			0.46	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.63
Panel A2. Placebo. Restricting the sample to weak societies using size-based power measure									
Mean indigenous democracy			-0.64 (2.16)	0.18 (1.62)	2.19 (1.88)	1.07 (1.83)	0.51 (1.96)	1.00 (1.77)	0.93 (1.99)
Observations			27	46	61	73	76	77	80
R-squared			0.48	0.45	0.41	0.40	0.36	0.37	0.45
Panel B. Weighting the data with the complexity-based power measure									
			Settlement complexity, $c$						
			Semi-nomadic	Semi-sedentary	Compact, impermanent	Dispersed homesteads	Single community	Compact permanent	Complex settlement
Mean indigenous democracy	1.99 (1.41)	2.01+ (1.35)	1.97 (1.38)	1.94+ (1.32)	1.89 (1.31)	1.90+ (1.30)	1.92 (1.33)	2.23+ (1.37)	2.21+ (1.39)
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
R-squared	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.42
Weights used	None	Linear	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1
Panel B1. Restricting the sample to strong societies using complexity-based power measure									
Mean indigenous democracy			2.25+ (1.47)	2.96** (1.28)	3.10** (1.31)	3.07** (1.30)	2.65* (1.45)	3.53** (1.58)	0.53 (3.35)
Observations			100	96	94	94	89	86	20
R-squared			0.43	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.74
Panel B2. Placebo. Restricting the sample to weak societies using complexity-based power measure									
Mean indigenous democracy			1.78 (2.56)	0.47 (2.79)	-2.32 (2.98)	-1.65 (2.89)	-1.83 (2.05)	-2.66+ (1.66)	1.99 (1.42)
Observations			26	35	46	49	66	73	101
R-squared			0.72	0.57	0.51	0.47	0.46	0.44	0.40

*Notes.* All models include controls for latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), and region fixed effects. All models include a constant term (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*, and + indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent levels.



Table A4. Alternative aggregation method using power measure based on proximity to the capital

Dep var: Mean polity2 1990-2010	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Societies within distance d	.	.	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000
Panel A. Weighting the data by distance-based power measure												
Mean indigenous democracy	2.14 (1.38)	2.60* (1.34)	2.18+ (1.36)	1.89 (1.31)	2.01+ (1.27)	2.90** (1.33)	2.62* (1.38)	2.44* (1.38)	2.46* (1.43)	2.56* (1.43)	2.27+ (1.45)	2.36+ (1.44)
Weights used	None	1/ <i>dist</i>	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1	0.1-1
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
R-squared	0.47	0.45	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42
Panel B. Restricting the sample to strong societies												
Mean indigenous democracy			2.85 (2.37)	3.10** (1.41)	3.38** (1.33)	4.58*** (1.24)	4.58*** (1.38)	3.48** (1.53)	3.68** (1.59)	3.61** (1.50)	3.19** (1.59)	3.32** (1.58)
Observations			40	72	81	85	90	97	99	101	102	102
R-squared			0.47	0.43	0.46	0.50	0.49	0.47	0.48	0.49	0.47	0.47
Panel C. Placebo. Restricting the sample to weak societies												
Mean indigenous democracy			0.64 (1.89)	1.03 (2.40)	-0.12 (2.15)	-1.18 (2.22)	-1.38 (2.57)	-2.02 (2.40)	-1.55 (2.60)	-2.30 (2.47)	-0.26 (2.63)	0.92 (4.01)
Observations			89	80	76	67	59	47	44	40	35	30
R-squared			0.47	0.46	0.48	0.45	0.42	0.54	0.57	0.56	0.60	0.58

*Notes.* All models include controls for latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), region fixed effects, and controls for (log) distance to the ocean and the area of the country. All models include a constant term (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

### 3. Alternative measures of indigenous democracy

The measure of indigenous democracy used throughout was coded using the variable *Succession to the office of the local headman* (variable v276 in SCCS and v72 in the Ethnographic Atlas). This variable takes on eight different values, shown in Table 1, and we code societies as democratic if leaders are selected by either of the two categories "election or other formal consensus" or "informal consensus". Otherwise, we code the society as undemocratic. Table A5 below shows the main results for slightly different measures of indigenous democracy. Column (1) replicates the main result, column (2) uses only the Ethnographic Atlas and ignores data from the SCCS, column (3) supplements the original variable with information from an additional variable available in the SCCS called *Primary political succession* (variable v77). While this variable does not only concern election of the headman, it has a category termed "No headmen or council". In column (3), missings in the original democracy measure were replaced by zero if variable v77 stated "No headmen or council". Column (4) replicates the original democracy variable, but defines a society as democratic only if it based its' selection of local headmen on "election or other formal consensus", column (5) uses the same measure as column (4), but exploits only information from the Ethnographic Atlas. Last, column (6) uses the same measure as in column (4), but adds the information available from variable v77.

Table A5. Main results with alternative measures of indigenous democracy

Survey	EA+SCCS	EA	EA+SCCS	EA+SCCS	EA	EA+SCCS
Variable v77	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Informal consensus included	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Dependent variable: mean polity2 1990-2010	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Power measure based on size						
Indigenous democracy x influential society	4.70** (2.26)	4.71** (2.26)	3.58* (2.04)	4.32** (2.02)	4.32** (2.02)	3.54* (1.92)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	0.79 (1.86)	0.82 (1.86)	0.89 (1.84)	0.38 (1.90)	0.39 (1.90)	0.47 (1.88)
Observations	93	93	96	93	93	96
R-squared	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.45
Panel B. Power measure based on societal complexity						
Indigenous democracy x influential society	3.74** (1.57)	3.75** (1.58)	3.68** (1.63)	3.04** (1.40)	3.04** (1.40)	3.07** (1.48)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	-3.52* (2.12)	-3.50 (2.12)	-3.57* (2.10)	-3.89 (2.45)	-3.89 (2.45)	-3.85 (2.40)
Observations	104	104	107	104	104	107
R-squared	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.46
Panel C. Power measure based on distance to the capital						
Indigenous democracy x influential society	4.69*** (1.26)	4.28*** (1.50)	3.93** (1.52)	3.71*** (1.40)	3.72*** (1.40)	3.54** (1.45)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.42 (2.40)	-2.20 (2.48)	-2.12 (2.35)	-2.12 (2.35)	-1.81 (2.44)
Observations	104	104	107	104	104	107
R-squared	0.53	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.45

*Notes.* All models include controls for latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), region fixed effects, and the share of powerful societies in a country based on the particular power measure.

Panel C also includes controls for (log) distance to the ocean and the area of the country. All models include a constant term (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*, and + indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent levels.

## 4. Correlates of indigenous democracy

The main specifications include controls for year of observation, absolute latitude of the country centroid, the share of powerful societies in a country, and region fixed effects. Furthermore, Tables 6 and 9 add controls for potential determinants of democracy. However, one remaining concern is that indigenous democracy may be correlated with various factors, which are also correlated with contemporary democracy, and which are not accounted for in Tables 6 and 9. If these various factors affect contemporary democracy more in the more powerful societies, the observed association between contemporary and indigenous democracy in powerful tribes may be spurious. To investigate, we select all potentially relevant factors in the Ethnographic Atlas and calculate potentially relevant geographic information based on the latitude and longitude of the societies. We have selected the variables based on the anthropological literature outlined in Section 8 and in addition, we chose all remaining potentially relevant variables with enough observations. These variables can be grouped into four groups; fishing and agriculture, conflict, development, and the hierarchical structure of a society.

Table A6 shows the simple correlation coefficients between indigenous democracy and these four groups of variables.

Table A6. Simple correlations between indigenous democracy and potential determinants

Dependence on fishing	-0.05 (0.13)
Dependence on agriculture	-0.01 (0.71)
Presence of the plough	0.19 (0.00)
Agricultural suitability	0.04 (0.19)
Soil constraints	-0.17 (0.00)
Average precipitation	-0.07 (0.04)
Average temperature	-0.14 (0.00)
Ruggedness	0.05 (0.16)
Remoteness	0.06 (0.07)
(ln) Distance to capital	0.07 (0.03)
(ln) Distance to cntr centroid	0.03 (0.31)
Societal complexity	-0.04 (0.25)
Mean population size	0.13 (0.00)
Jurisdictional hierarchy	0.06 (0.06)
Centralized	0.05 (0.12)
Political integration	0.20 (0.00)

We next check whether these correlations are robust to including the baseline controls, region fixed effects, year of measurement and absolute latitude by running regressions of the form:

$$Indig_i = \alpha + \beta_1 control_i + \gamma_{baseline} + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

for each ethnographic society  $i$ . *baseline* refers to baseline controls, which include region fixed effects, year of measurement, and absolute latitude. Table A7 shows the results.

Table A7. Determinants of indigenous democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dependent variable: Indigenous democracy																		
Dependence on fishing	-0.03*** (0.01)																	
Dependence on agriculture		0.02*** (0.01)																
Presence of the plough			0.25*** (0.05)															
Agricultural suitability				0.02 (0.06)														
Soil constraints					-0.25* (0.13)													
Average precipitation						-0.67** (0.29)												
Average temperature							-1.15 (3.25)											
Ruggedness								-0.00** (0.00)										
Remoteness									0.04* (0.02)									
(ln) Distance to capital										-0.02 (0.01)								
(ln) Distance to cntr centroid											-0.04** (0.02)							
(ln) Country area												-0.01 (0.01)						
(ln) Distance to the ocean													0.01** (0.00)					
Societal complexity														0.01 (0.01)				
Mean population size															0.04*** (0.01)			
Jurisdictional hierarchy																0.06*** (0.01)		
Centralized																	0.11*** (0.03)	
Political integration																		0.04*** (0.02)
Observations	901	901	870	901	874	876	876	901	901	897	887	901	901	872	462	858	858	266
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.14

Notes. All models include a constant term. Baseline controls for absolute latitude, timing (the year to which the ethnographic information pertains) and regions fixed effects are included throughout.

To investigate further whether the omission of these determinants of indigenous democracy could potentially be driving our results, we next investigate whether they are correlated with contemporary democracy. We thus aggregate the variables to the country level and run regressions with the aggregated controls with average polity as the dependent variable in Table A8. The table shows that only three of the significant variables from Table A7 also have a significant bearing viz-a-viz contemporary democracy; soil constraints, average precipitation, and distance to the ocean.

Table A8. Impact of indigenous controls on contemporary democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dependent variable: mean polity2 1990-2010																		
Dependence on fishing	0.36 (0.61)																	
Dependence on agriculture		0.25 (0.31)																
Presence of the plough			1.52 (1.83)															
Agricultural suitability				5.95** (2.37)														
Soil constraints					-10.58** (4.93)													
Average precipitation						22.94** (10.20)												
Average temperature							29.95 (119.62)											
Ruggedness								0.00 (0.00)										
Remoteness									-0.94 (0.88)									
(ln) Distance to capital										-0.12 (0.40)								
(ln) Distance to cntr centroid											-0.42 (0.43)							
(ln) Country area												-0.36 (0.30)						
(ln) Distance to the ocean													-0.37*** (0.12)					
Societal complexity														0.18 (0.28)				
Mean population size															0.29 (0.25)			
Jurisdictional hierarchy																-0.21 (0.57)		
Centralized																	0.29 (1.39)	
Political integration																		-0.31 (0.36)
Observations	125	125	123	125	125	125	125	125	125	123	125	125	125	123	109	123	123	89
R-squared	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.43	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.46	0.43	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.51

Notes. All models include a constant term. Baseline controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), and regions fixed effects are included throughout.



Last, Table A9 adds all controls from above to the main regressions investigated. The main estimate of interest is unchanged throughout but renders insignificant when adding the control for integration, which seems to be simply due to the reduced amount of observations. Further, this control is insignificant in the regression on contemporary democracy (Table A8, col 18), which reduces significance of all other variables.

Table A9. Including indigenous controls to the main specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dependent variable: mean polity2 1990-2010																		
Panel A: Baseline regressions with size as power measure																		
Indigenous democracy x influential society	4.71** (2.31)	4.68** (2.26)	4.63* (2.34)	4.43* (2.24)	4.81** (2.36)	4.36** (2.18)	4.78** (2.34)	4.57* (2.36)	4.70** (2.28)	5.01** (2.36)	4.77** (2.39)	4.60** (2.26)	5.21*** (1.94)	4.69** (2.33)	4.76** (2.30)	4.90** (2.37)	4.59** (2.30)	0.74 (3.32)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	0.81 (1.88)	0.82 (1.98)	0.80 (1.88)	0.91 (1.86)	0.90 (1.88)	0.90 (1.78)	0.83 (1.85)	0.73 (1.92)	0.81 (1.92)	0.58 (1.87)	0.78 (1.87)	0.78 (1.85)	0.43 (1.60)	0.79 (1.91)	0.56 (2.33)	0.79 (1.88)	0.71 (1.90)	1.19 (2.25)
Observations	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	74
R-squared	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.50	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.48
Panel B: Baseline regressions with complexity as power measure																		
Indigenous democracy x influential society	3.65** (1.62)	3.74** (1.58)	3.75** (1.63)	3.47** (1.54)	3.66** (1.61)	3.92** (1.60)	3.75** (1.58)	3.69** (1.60)	3.76** (1.59)	4.04** (1.69)	3.69** (1.69)	3.65** (1.59)	5.01*** (1.40)	3.73** (1.61)	4.15** (1.77)	3.79** (1.70)	3.54** (1.61)	3.68 (2.26)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	-3.60* (2.14)	-3.53 (2.35)	-3.51 (2.12)	-2.71 (2.38)	-3.21 (2.11)	-3.05 (2.20)	-3.80* (2.22)	-3.58 (2.19)	-3.48 (2.20)	-3.97* (2.03)	-3.45 (2.10)	-3.26 (2.04)	-3.59* (2.04)	-4.04* (2.32)	-1.32 (2.13)	-3.48 (2.11)	-3.77* (2.13)	-3.14 (2.38)
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	96	104	104	79
R-squared	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.49
Panel C: Baseline regressions with distance to capital as power measure																		
Indigenous democracy x influential society	4.94*** (1.29)	4.68*** (1.26)	4.47*** (1.26)	4.51*** (1.18)	5.03*** (1.34)	4.70*** (1.27)	4.71*** (1.28)	4.92*** (1.32)	4.74*** (1.27)	4.77*** (1.27)	4.38*** (1.27)	4.69*** (1.26)	4.69*** (1.26)	4.91*** (1.29)	5.78*** (1.47)	4.45*** (1.29)	4.39*** (1.23)	4.05** (1.58)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	-3.45 (2.26)	-2.89 (2.21)	-3.80* (2.08)	-2.60 (2.16)	-3.01 (2.08)	-2.94 (2.25)	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.88 (2.19)	-2.80 (2.29)	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.73 (2.19)	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.98 (2.31)	-1.54 (2.54)	-3.42 (2.27)	-3.90* (2.30)	-2.72 (2.68)
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	96	104	104	79
R-squared	0.56	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.54	0.55

Notes. The table corresponds to Table A8, except that indigenous democracy in powerful and non-powerful groups together with the share of powerful groups is included throughout.

#### **4. Relation between the three power measures**

To further investigate the robustness of our results towards the particular measure of power, we construct two new power measures based on our three main measures of political power. One measure, used in Table A11 columns (1) and (2), is a dummy equal to one if the society is defined as powerful according to at least one of the power measures, zero if neither of the power measures define the society as powerful. Columns (1) and (2) are equivalent; while the impact of indigenous democracy in powerful societies in column (1) is the sum of the two estimates, column (2) shows this estimate directly as is done throughout the paper. The other measure equals zero if neither of the three power measures define the society as powerful (242 societies), one if only one measure does (167), two if two measures (109) and three if all three measures define the society as powerful (61). The linear interaction with this measure is shown in column (3), while the interactions with dummies for this sum being larger than zero, one, and two, respectively are shown in columns (4)-(6).

In general, the main results hold when using these combined measures of power instead.

#### **5. Additional Robustness checks**

Table A10. Correlation table across power dummies

Power dummies:	size	complex	proximity to capital
Panel A. Simple correlation without controls			
Size $\geq$ 1000 inhabitants	1.00		
Complexity $\geq$ compact	0.44 (0.00)	1.00	
Distance to capital $<$ 400 km	0.30 (0.00)	0.19 (0.00)	1.00
Panel B. Correlation with controls			
Size $\geq$ 1000 inhabitants	1.00		
Complexity $\geq$ compact	0.39 (0.00)	1.00	
Distance to capital $<$ 400 km	0.21 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)	1.00

The number of observations is 579 indigenous societies. Panel A shows the simple correlation, while Panel B includes controls for absolute latitude, average year of measurement and region fixed effects.

Table A11. Aggregated power measures

Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Power measure:	either			sum of all measures		
				> 0	> 1	> 2
Indigenous democracy	-6.46*** (2.01)		-0.94 (2.47)			
Indigenous democracy x influential society	11.14*** (2.41)	4.69*** (1.35)	2.33** (1.10)	4.65*** (1.42)	4.76*** (1.63)	5.31** (2.24)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society		-6.46*** (2.01)		-5.43* (2.97)	-1.61 (1.92)	1.24 (1.56)
Observations	104	104	93	93	93	93
R-squared	0.54	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.51	0.50
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Power	either	either	sum	sum>0	sum>1	sum>2

Notes. All models include a constant term. Baseline controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), regions fixed effects, and the share of powerful societies are included throughout.

Table A12. Indigenous democracy corrected using the Putterman-Weil matrix

Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Measure of power	Size			Complexity			Capitals		
Putterman-Weil correction	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Indigenous democracy x influential society	4.78*	4.84*	4.45*	4.31**	4.08*	3.51**	4.88***	4.73**	4.26***
	(2.45)	(2.53)	(2.27)	(2.12)	(2.18)	(1.63)	(1.84)	(1.85)	(1.56)
Indigenous democracy x non-influential society	-0.13	-0.26	0.70	-4.34*	-4.29	-3.51	-2.31	-2.34	-2.40
	(2.07)	(2.19)	(1.88)	(2.59)	(2.61)	(2.13)	(2.69)	(2.70)	(2.42)
Observations	97	89	89	103	100	100	103	100	100
R-squared	0.46	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.44

*Notes.* All models include a constant term. All columns include controls for region fixed effects, controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), and the share of powerful societies (Putterman-Weil corrected or not) according to the particular cutoff. Columns (6)-(9) also include controls for (ln) area and (ln) distance to the ocean. The sample in columns (2), (5), and (8) is restricted to that with information on the original measure of indigenous democracy used throughout the paper.

Table A13. Robustness with Respect to Sample and Influential Observations

Dependent variable is mean polity2 1990-2010						
	Full	Excl. Europe and neo-Europe	Excl. early decile	Excl. late decile	Excl. CooksD	Excl. Leverage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A</i> Political power proxied by society size						
Indigenous democracy with 1000 inhabitants or above	4.70** (2.26)	6.50** (2.64)	5.26** (2.39)	4.07* (2.14)	4.70** (2.26)	4.67** (2.29)
Indigenous democracy with 1000 inhabitants or below	0.79 (1.86)	1.07 (1.91)	0.34 (1.85)	1.27 (1.88)	0.79 (1.86)	0.48 (1.91)
Observations	93	80	89	90	93	87
R-squared	0.44	0.32	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.45
<i>Panel B</i> Political power proxied by societal complexity						
Indigenous democracy with complexity level $\geq 7$	3.74** (1.57)	4.77** (1.93)	3.55** (1.73)	3.80** (1.55)	3.74** (1.57)	4.43*** (1.62)
Indigenous democracy with complexity level $< 7$	-3.52* (2.12)	-3.55 (2.16)	-3.93 (2.48)	-4.30* (2.35)	-3.52* (2.12)	-4.63 (3.92)
Observations	104	91	101	101	104	97
R-squared	0.46	0.34	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.45
<i>Panel C</i> Political power proxied by proximity to the capital						
Indigenous democracy within 400 km of capital	4.69*** (1.26)	5.35*** (1.68)	4.47*** (1.29)	4.54*** (1.29)	4.69*** (1.26)	4.74*** (1.43)
Indigenous democracy outside 400 km of capital	-2.90 (2.18)	-3.23 (2.54)	-2.97 (2.23)	-2.09 (2.39)	-2.90 (2.18)	-2.99 (2.62)
Observations	104	91	101	101	104	99
R-squared	0.53	0.44	0.54	0.51	0.53	0.53

*Notes.* All models include a constant term. Baseline controls included throughout: controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), region fixed effects, and share of powerful societies according to the particular power measure. In addition, Panel C includes (ln) distance to the ocean and (ln) country area. The model in column (3) excludes the 194 societies for which the information in the Ethnographic Atlas refers to years before 1860. Column (4) excludes the 54 societies with information from after year 1950. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table A14. Corresponding beta coefficients for Table 9

Powerful society defined by:	Society size $\geq 1000$				Complexity level $\geq 7$				Distance to capital $< 400$ km			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dependent variable: Mean polity2 1990-2010												
Indigenous democracy in powerful societies	0.21	0.25	0.31	0.28	0.21	0.22	0.24	0.19	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.28
Indigenous democracy in non-powerful societies	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.03	-0.10	-0.03	-0.08	-0.09	-0.14	-0.06	-0.08	-0.15
(log) GDP per capita 2000	0.41				0.29				0.15			
Protestant share 2000		-0.01				0.05				0.11		
Muslim share 2000		-0.18				-0.16				-0.13		
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.24				-0.12				-0.08	
Linguistic fractionalization			0.18				0.09				0.11	
Religious fractionalization			-0.08				-0.02				0.05	
Oil (1000 barrels) 2000 per capita				-0.16				-0.16				-0.14
Observations	89	90	88	89	99	100	96	99	99	100	96	99
R-squared	0.51	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.51	0.49	0.48	0.50	0.58	0.56	0.54	0.59

*Notes.* The table shows the corresponding beta coefficients for the regressions in Table 9.



Table A15. Different measures of democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Democracy measure	polity	polity	FH	FH	polity	polity	FH	FH	polity	polity	FH	FH
Years	1990-2000	2000-2010	1990-2010	1990-2010	1990-2000	2000-2010	1990-2010	1990-2010	1990-2000	2000-2010	1990-2010	1990-2010
Measure of societal power	1000 inhabitants or more				Compact or complex settlement				Within 400 km of the capital			
Indigenous democracy x powerful society	3.80+	4.79**	0.49	0.85	4.07**	3.36*	0.74	1.06*	5.37***	4.34***	0.86*	1.37***
	(2.53)	(2.25)	(0.88)	(1.11)	(1.55)	(1.80)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(1.41)	(1.43)	(0.45)	(0.42)
Indigenous democracy x weak society	1.68	-0.16	-0.02	-0.18	-2.54	-4.32**	-1.08+	0.31	-2.05	-3.78*	-1.43*	-1.21
	(1.88)	(2.20)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(2.45)	(2.05)	(0.70)	(1.12)	(2.35)	(2.25)	(0.84)	(1.15)
Observations	91	92	90	83	101	103	102	97	101	103	100	95
R-squared	0.50	0.36	0.49	0.51	0.53	0.37	0.50	0.51	0.56	0.47	0.56	0.57
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Ex infl	Full	Full	Full	Ex infl	Full	Full	Full	Ex infl

*Notes.* The dependent variable is the average of the polity IV index in 1990-2000 in columns (1), (5), and (9), the average polity IV index in 2000-2010 in columns (2), (6), and (10), and the Freedom House index for political rights in the remaining columns. The measure of political power is based on societal size (1000 inhabitants or more) in columns (1)-(4), settlement complexity (compact or complex society) in columns (5)-(8), and proximity to the capital (located within 400 km of the capital city) in columns (9)-(12). All models include a constant term, controls for absolute latitude, timing (the average year to which the ethnographic information in a country pertains), region fixed effects, and the share of societies defined as politically strong according to each particular definition. Columns (9)-(12) also include controls for (ln) distance to the ocean and (ln) country area. The sample is restricted to the sample excluding influential observations (leverage<1) in columns (4), (8), and (12). Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*, and + indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent levels.