Chapter 7

The Ramsey model

As early as 1928 a sophisticated model of a society’s optimal saving was published by the British mathematician Frank Ramsey (1903-1930). Ramsey’s contribution was mathematically demanding and did not experience a strong response at the time. Three decades had to pass until his contribution was taken up seriously (Samuelson and Solow, 1956). The model was fusioned with Solow’s simpler growth model (Solow 1956) and became a cornerstone in neoclassical growth theory from the mid 1960s. The version of the model which we present below was completed by the work of Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). Hence the model is also known as the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model.

The model is one of the basic workhorse models of macroeconomics. It can be seen as placed at one end of a line segment, with another workhorse model as placed at the other end, namely Diamond’s overlapping generations model. In the Diamond model there is an infinite number of agents (since in every new period a new generation enters the economy) and these have a finite time horizon. In the Ramsey model there is a finite number of agents with an infinite time horizon; further, these agents are completely alike. The Ramsey model is thus a representative agent model, whereas the Diamond model has heterogeneous agents (young and old) interacting in every period. These differences in the basic setup turn out to have important implications for the conclusions.

Along the line segment, which has these two frameworks as polar cases, less abstract models are scattered, some being closer to the one pole and others closer to the other. A given model may open up for different regimes, one close to Ramsey’s pole, another close to Diamond’s. An example is Barro’s model, from Chapter 5, with parental altruism. When the bequest motive is operative, the Barro model coincides with a Ramsey model (in discrete time). But when the bequest motive is not operative, the Barro model
coincides with a Diamond OLG model. In later chapters we extend the perspective by including government, public debt, money, market imperfections etc. It turns out that for several issues it matters a lot whether one uses a Ramsey setup or an overlapping generations setup.

The Ramsey framework can be formulated in discrete time as well as in continuous time. This chapter concentrates on the continuous time version as did Ramsey’s original contribution. We first study the Ramsey framework under the conditions of a perfect-competition market economy. In this context we will see that the Solow growth model comes out as a special case of the Ramsey model. Next we consider the Ramsey framework in a setting with an “all-knowing and all-powerful” social planner. The next chapter applies Ramsey’s framework to a series of issues, including welfare implications of alternative policies to promote economic growth.

7.1 Market conditions

We consider a closed economy. Time is continuous. At any point in time there are three active markets, one for the “all-purpose” output good, one for labor, and one for capital services (the rental market for capital goods). For the sake of intuition, it can be useful to imagine that there is also a loan market, which we name the bond market, with a short-term interest rate $r$. But since households are alike, in general equilibrium this market will not be used. There is perfect competition in all markets, that is, prices are exogenous to the individual agents.

To fix ideas, we assume that the households own the capital goods and hire them out to firms.\footnote{If instead the firms owned the real capital while household’s held financial claims on the firms (shares and bonds), the conclusions would remain unaltered as long as we ignore uncertainty.} Since the technology exhibits constant returns to scale and there is perfect competition, the firms, owned by the household sector as a whole, do not make (pure) profit in equilibrium. Any need for means of payment — money — is abstracted away. Prices are measured in current output units.

Although the variables in the model are considered as continuous functions of time, $t$, we shall, to save notation, write them as $w_t$, $r_t$, etc. (instead of $w(t)$, $r(t)$, etc.). In every short time interval $(t, t + \Delta t)$, the individual firm employs labor at the market wage $w_t$ and rents capital goods at the rental rate $\hat{r}_t$. The combination of labor and capital produces the homogeneous output good. This can be used for consumption as well as investment.

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Since we assume that households understand precisely how the economy works, they can predict the future path of wages and interest rates. That is, we assume perfect foresight. Owing to this absence of uncertainty, the consequences of a choice are known. And rates of return on alternative assets must in equilibrium be the same. So the (short-term) interest rate in the bond market must equal the rate of return on real capital in equilibrium, that is,

\[ r_t = \hat{r}_t - \delta, \tag{7.1} \]

where \( \delta \geq 0 \) is a constant rate of capital depreciation. This no-arbitrage condition shows how the interest rate is related to the rental rate of capital.

Below we present, first, the households’ behavior and, next, the firms’ behavior. After this, the interaction between households and firms in general equilibrium will be analyzed.

### 7.2 Agents

**The households**

There is a fixed number of identical households with an infinite time horizon. This feature makes aggregation very simple: we just have to multiply the behavior of the single household with the number of households. We may interpret the infinite horizon of the household as reflecting a Barro-style altruistic bequest motive (cf. Chapter 5). The household may thus be seen as a family dynasty whose current members act in unity and are also concerned with the welfare of future generations. Every family has \( L_t \) members and \( L_t \) changes over time at a constant rate, \( n \):

\[ L_t = L_0 e^{nt}. \tag{7.2} \]

In contrast, in a standard OLG model births reflect the emergence of new economic agents, that is, new decision makers whose preferences no-one has cared about in advance.

Every family member inelastically supplies one unit of labor per time unit. Equation (7.2) therefore describes the growth of the population as well as the labor force. Since there is only one consumption good, the only decision problem is how to distribute current income between consumption and saving. The savings are placed in either real capital or short-term bonds. If the household wishes to dissave, it can simply sell its stock of real capital or issue bonds.

The household’s preferences can be represented by an additive utility function with a constant utility discount rate, \( \rho \), called the rate of time
preference or the rate of impatience. Seen from time 0, the utility function is
\[ U_0 = \int_0^\infty u(c_t) L_t e^{-\rho t} dt, \]
where \( c_t \equiv C_t / L_t \) is consumption per family member. The instantaneous utility function \( u \) has \( u' > 0 \) and \( u'' < 0 \), i.e., positive but diminishing marginal utility. The utility contribution from consumption per family member is weighted by the number of family members, \( L_t \). In this way, it is the sum of the family members’ utility that counts which is why \( U_0 \) is sometimes referred to as a classical-utilitarian utility function with discounting. Because of (7.2), \( U_0 \) can be written as
\[ U_0 = \int_0^\infty u(c_t) e^{-(\rho-n)t} dt, \quad (7.3) \]
where the unimportant positive factor \( L_0 \) has been eliminated. We may call \( \bar{\rho} \equiv \rho - n \) the effective rate of time preference while \( \rho \) is the pure rate of time preference. We later introduce a restriction on \( \rho - n \) to ensure boundedness of the utility integral.

The household chooses a consumption-saving plan which maximizes \( U_0 \) subject to a budget constraint. Let \( A_t \equiv a_t L_t \) be the household’s (net) financial wealth in real terms as of time \( t \). We have
\[ \dot{A}_t = r_t A_t + w_t L_t - c_t L_t, \quad A_0 \text{ given.} \quad (7.4) \]
This equation is a book-keeping relation telling how financial wealth or debt \((-A)\) is evolving depending on how consumption relates to current income. The equation merely says that the increase in financial wealth per time unit equals saving which equals income minus consumption. Income consists of return on wealth, \( r_t A_t \), and wage income, \( w_t L_t \). Because of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, firms have no pure profits to pay the owners, i.e., the households.

When the flow-budget identity (7.4) is combined with a requirement of solvency, we have a budget constraint. The relevant solvency requirement is the No-Ponzi-Game condition (NPG)
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} A_t e^{-\int_0^t r_s ds} \geq 0. \quad (7.5) \]
This condition says that financial wealth far out in the future can not have a negative present value. That is, in the long run, debt must at most rise at
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a rate less than the real interest rate \( r \). The NPG condition thus precludes permanent financing of the interest payments by new loans.\(^2\)

The decision problem is: choose a plan \((c_t)_{t=0}^\infty\) such that a maximum of \( U_0 \) is achieved subject to non-negativity of the control variable \( c \) and the constraints (7.4) and (7.5). The problem is the same as that considered in Chapter 6, except that the labor supply of the family is now growing over time.

To solve the problem we apply the Maximum Principle. This method can be applied directly to the problem in the form given above or to the equivalent problem with constraints expressed in per capita terms. Let us follow the latter approach. From the definition \( a_t \equiv A_t/L_t \) we get by differentiation wrt. \( t \)

\[
\dot{a}_t = \frac{L_t \dot{A}_t - A_t \dot{L}_t}{L_t^2} = \frac{\dot{A}_t}{L_t} - a_t n.
\]

Substitution of (7.4) gives the flow-budget identity in per capita terms:

\[
\dot{a}_t = (r_t - n)a_t + w_t - c_t, \quad a_0 \text{ given.} \tag{7.6}
\]

By inserting \( A_t \equiv a_t L_t = a_t L_0 e^{nt} \), the No-Ponzi-Game condition (7.5) can be rewritten as

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} a_t e^{-\int_0^t (r_s - n) ds} \geq 0, \tag{7.7}
\]

where the unimportant factor \( L_0 \) has been eliminated. We see that in both (7.6) and (7.7) the growth-corrected real interest rate \( r_t - n \) appears. Although deferring consumption gives a real interest rate of \( r_t \), this return is diluted on a per head basis because it will have to be shared with more members of the family when \( n > 0 \). In the form (7.7) the NPG condition requires that debt, if any, in the long run rises at most at a rate less than the population growth-corrected interest rate.

Now the problem is: choose \((c_t)_{t=0}^\infty\) so as to a maximize \( U_0 \) subject to the constraints: \( c_t \geq 0 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \), (7.6), and (7.7). We follow the solution procedure from the previous chapter:

1) Set up the current-value Hamiltonian

\[
H(a, c, \lambda, t) = u(c) + \lambda [(r - n)a + w - c],
\]

where \( \lambda \) is the adjoint variable associated with the dynamic constraint (7.6) (the explicit dating of the variables \( a, c, \) and \( \lambda \) is omitted where it is not required for clarity).

\(^2\)In the previous chapter we saw that the NPG condition, in combination with (7.4), is equivalent to an ordinary intertemporal budget constraint which says that the present value of the planned consumption path cannot exceed the sum of the initial financial wealth and the present value of expected future labor income.
2) With a view to maximizing the Hamiltonian wrt. to the control variable, \( c \), consider the first-order condition
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial c} = u'(c) - \lambda = 0,
\]
that is,
\[
u'(c) = \lambda. \tag{7.8}
\]

3) Differentiate \( H \) partially wrt. the state variable, \( a \), and set the result equal to the effective rate of discount (appearing in the integrand of the criterion function) multiplied by \( \lambda \) minus the time derivative of the adjoint variable \( \lambda \):
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial a} = \lambda(r - n) = (\rho - n)\lambda - \dot{\lambda},
\]
that is,
\[
\dot{\lambda} = -(r - \rho)\lambda. \tag{7.9}
\]

4) Apply the Maximum Principle which (for this case) says: an optimal path \( (a_t, c_t)_{t=0}^{\infty} \) will satisfy that there exists a continuous function \( \lambda(t) \) such that for all \( t \geq 0 \), (7.8) and (7.9) hold along the path and the transversality condition,
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \lambda_t e^{-(\rho - n)t} a_t = 0, \tag{7.10}
\]
is satisfied.

The interpretation of these optimality conditions is as follows. The condition (7.8) can be considered a \( MC = MB \) condition (in utility terms). It illustrates together with (7.9) that the adjoint variable \( \lambda \) can be seen as a shadow price, measured in current utility, of per head financial wealth along the optimal path. Rearranging (7.9) gives, \( r_t = \rho - \dot{\lambda}_t/\lambda_t \); the left-hand-side of this equation is the market rate of return on saving while the right-hand-side is the \textit{required} rate of return (as in the previous chapter, by subtracting the shadow price “inflation rate” from the required utility rate of return, \( \rho \), we get the required real rate of return). The household is willing to save the marginal unit of income only if the actual return equals the required return.

The transversality condition (7.10) says that for \( t \to \infty \) the present shadow value of per head financial wealth should go to zero. Combined with (7.8), the condition is that
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} u'(c_t) e^{-(\rho - n)t} a_t = 0 \tag{7.11}
\]
must hold along the optimal path. This requirement is not surprising if we compare with the case where instead \( \lim_{t \to \infty} u'(c_t) e^{-(\rho - n)t} a_t > 0 \). In this case
there would be over-saving; $U_0$ could be increased by ultimately consuming more and saving less, that is, reducing the “ultimate” $a_t$. The opposite case, $\lim_{t \to \infty} u'(c_t) e^{-(\rho-n)t} a_t < 0$, will not even satisfy the NPG condition in view of Proposition 2 of the previous chapter. In fact, from that proposition we know that the transversality condition (7.11) is equivalent to the NPG condition (7.7) being satisfied with strict equality, i.e.,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} a_t e^{-\int_0^t (r_s-n) ds} = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7.12)

This implication will turn out to be very useful in the general equilibrium analysis below.

Recall that the Maximum Principle gives only necessary conditions for an optimal plan. But since the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in $(a, c)$ for every $t$, then the necessary conditions are also sufficient, by Mangasarian’s sufficiency theorem.

Compared with the problem without growth in the size of the household (from the previous chapter), $r_t$ has been replaced by $r_t - n$ in the dynamic constraint, while $\rho$ has been replaced by $\rho - n$ both in the criterion function and in the transversality condition. In this way the effect of $n$ on consumption behavior is neutralized and the Keynes-Ramsey rule implied by the model ends up the same as if $n = 0$. Indeed, the first-order conditions (7.8) and (7.9) again give

$$\frac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} = \frac{1}{\theta(c_t)} (r_t - \rho),$$  \hspace{1cm} (7.13)

where

$$\theta(c_t) \equiv -\frac{c_t}{u'(c_t)} u''(c_t) > 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7.14)

Here, $\theta(c_t)$ is the (absolute) elasticity of marginal utility and indicates how much the consumer wishes to smooth consumption over time. The inverse of $\theta(c_t)$ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. It measures the willingness to incur variation in consumption over time in response to a change in the interest rate. These concepts have been discussed in more detail in previous chapters.

In order that the model can accommodate Kaldor’s stylized facts (see Chapter 3), it should be able to generate a balanced growth path. When population grows at the same constant rate as the labor force, here $n$, balanced growth will require that per capita output, per capita capital, and per capita consumption grow at a constant rate. This will generally require that the real interest rate is constant in the process. But (7.13) shows that a constant per capita consumption growth rate, at the same time as $r$ is constant, is only possible if the elasticity of marginal utility does not vary.
with \( c \). Hence, we will from now on assume that the right-hand-side of (7.14) is a positive constant, \( \theta \). This amounts to assuming the instantaneous utility function is a CRRA function:

\[
u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}, \quad \theta > 0.
\] (7.15)

Recall, that the right-hand side can be interpreted as \( \ln c \) when \( \theta = 1 \). So our Keynes-Ramsey rule simplifies to

\[rac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} = \frac{1}{\theta} (r_t - \rho).
\] (7.16)

By itself, the Keynes-Ramsey rule is only a rule for the optimal rate of change of consumption. However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the chosen level of consumption, \( c_0 \), will be the highest feasible \( c_0 \) which is compatible with both the Keynes-Ramsey rule and the NPG condition. And for this reason the choice will exactly comply with the transversality condition (7.12). Even if an explicit specification of \( c_0 \) is not actually necessary for the analysis of the dynamics of the Ramsey model, we note that a simple extension of Example 1 of Chapter 6 to include the case \( n \neq 0 \) gives:

\[
\begin{align*}
c_0 &= \beta_0(a_0 + h_0), \quad \text{where} \\
\beta_0 &= \frac{1}{\int_0^\infty e^{\int_0^\tau \left( (1-\theta) r - \rho \right) d\tau} d\tau}, \quad \text{and} \\
h_0 &= \int_0^\infty w_t e^{-\int_0^\tau (r - n) d\tau} d\tau.
\end{align*}
\] (7.17)

Thus, the entire expected future evolution of wages and interest rates determines \( c_0 \). It is also seen that \( \beta_0 \), the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, is less, the greater is the rate of population growth \( n \).\(^4\) The explanation is that the effective utility discount rate, \( \rho - n \), is less, the greater is \( n \). The propensity to save is greater the more mouths to feed in the future.

All in all, by the assumption that households maximize present discounted utility, the Ramsey model endogenizes saving. The parametric saving-income ratio, \( s \), in the well-known Solow growth model, is replaced by \textit{two} parameters, the rate of impatience, \( \rho \), and the rate of consumption smoothing, \( \theta \). This adds perspectives to the analysis and implies that the saving-income ratio will not generally be constant outside steady state.\(^5\) Replacing a mechanical saving rule by maximization of discounted utility, the model opens up for studying welfare consequences of alternative economic policies.

\(^3\)To get these results, in Example 1 of Chapter 6 replace \( r(\tau) \) and \( \rho \) by \( r(\tau) - n \) and \( \rho - n \), respectively.

\(^4\)This also holds if \( \theta = 1 \), since in that case \( \beta_0 = \rho - n \).

\(^5\)Below, we return to a comparison with the Solow model.
7.3 General equilibrium

Firms

There is a large number of firms which maximize profits under perfect competition. The firms have the same neoclassical CRS production function,

\[ Y_s^t = F(K^d_t, T_t L^d_t) \]  

(7.18)

where \( Y_s^t \) is supply of output, \( K^d_t \) is capital input (machine-hours), and \( L^d_t \) is labor input (labor hours), all measured per time unit, at time \( t \). The superscript \( d \) on the two inputs indicates that so far input is seen as “demanded input”. The factor \( T_t \) represents the economy wide level of technology as of time \( t \) and it is exogenous to the firm. Technical progress implies growth in \( T_t \) over time,

\[ T_t = T_0 e^{gt}, \]  

(7.19)

where \( T_0 (> 0) \) and \( g (\geq 0) \) are given constants. Thus, the economy is assumed to feature Harrod-neutral technical progress at an exogenous rate, \( g \), as is needed for compliance with Kaldor’s stylized facts.

The profit corresponding to the factor demands is \( \Pi_t = F(K^d_t, T_t L^d_t) - \hat{r}_t K^d_t - w L^d_t \). Necessary and sufficient conditions for the factor combination \((K^d_t, L^d_t)\), where \( K^d_t > 0 \) and \( L^d_t > 0 \), to maximize profits are

\[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial K_t} = F_1(K^d_t, T_t L^d_t) - \hat{r}_t = 0, \]  

(7.20)

\[ \frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial L_t} = F_2(K^d_t, T_t L^d_t) T_t - w_t = 0, \]  

(7.21)

7.3 General equilibrium

We now consider the economy as a whole and thereby the interaction between households and firms in the various markets. For simplicity, we assume that the number of households is the same as the number of firms. We normalize this number to one so that \( F \) is from now on interpreted as the aggregate production function and \( C_t \) as aggregate consumption.

Factor markets

In the short term, that is, for fixed \( t \), the available quantities of labor, \( L_t \), and real capital, \( K_t \), are predetermined. Indeed, both the size of population and the total capital stock are at any point in time historically determined. Markets are assumed to clear at all points in time, that is,

\[ K^d_t = K_t, \quad \text{and} \quad L^d_t = L_t, \]  

(7.22)

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for all \( t \geq 0 \). It is the interest rate and the wage rate which adjust (immediately) so that this is achieved. Given (7.22), the supply of output becomes actual output:

\[
Y_t = F(K_t, T_tL_t) = T_tL_tF(\tilde{k}_t, 1) \equiv T_tL_t f(\tilde{k}_t), \quad \text{where } f' > 0, f'' < 0,
\]

(7.23)

and \( \tilde{k}_t \equiv K_t/(T_tL_t) \), and where we have used the assumption of constant returns to scale to introduce the production function on intensive form, \( f \).

By substitution of (7.22) into (7.20) and (7.21), we find the equilibrium factor prices:

\[
\hat{r}_t = r_t + \delta = F_1(K_t, T_tL_t) = \frac{\partial(T_tL_t f(\tilde{k}_t))}{\partial K_t} = f'(\tilde{k}_t), \quad (7.24)
\]

\[
w_t = F_2(K_t, T_tL_t)T_t = \frac{\partial(T_tL_t f(\tilde{k}_t))}{\partial (T_tL_t)} T_t = \left[ f(\tilde{k}_t) - \tilde{k}_t f'(\tilde{k}_t) \right] T_t \quad (7.25)
\]

where \( \hat{w}(\tilde{k}_t) \equiv f(\tilde{k}_t) - \tilde{k}_t f'(\tilde{k}_t) \). In (7.24) we have inserted the no-arbitrage condition (7.1). In that \( \tilde{k} \) at any point in time is predetermined, (7.24) and (7.25) give the equilibrium factor prices as determined by the respective marginal productivities of the factors of production under full utilization of the given factor supplies.

**Capital accumulation**

From national income and product accounting for a closed economy we have

\[
\dot{K} = Y - C - \delta K, \quad (7.26)
\]

where we leave out the explicit dating when not needed for clarity. Let us check whether we get the same result from the wealth accumulation equation of the household. Because real capital is the only asset in the economy, the real value of financial wealth, \( A \), at time \( t \) equals the total quantity of real capital, \( K \), at time \( t \).\(^6\) From (7.4) we thus have

\[
\dot{K} = rK + wL - cL
\]

\[
= (f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta)K + (f(\tilde{k}) - \tilde{k} f'(\tilde{k})) TL - cL \quad \text{(from (7.24) and (7.25))}
\]

\[
= f(\tilde{k})TL - \delta K - C \quad \text{(by rearranging and use of } cL = C \text{)}
\]

\[
= F(K, TL) - \delta K - C = Y - C - \delta K.
\]

\(^6\)Whatever financial claims on each other the households might have, they net out for the household sector as a whole.

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Hence, the book-keeping is in order (the national income account is consistent with the national product account).

We now face a fundamental difference as compared with models such as the Diamond OLG model, namely that current consumption cannot be determined independently of the expected long-term evolution. This is because consumption and saving, as we saw in Section 7.2, depend on the expectations of the entire future evolution of wages and interest rates. And given the presumption of rational expectations, the households’ expectations are identical to the prediction that can be calculated from the model. In this way, there is interdependence between the expectations and the level and evolution of consumption. We can thus determine the level of consumption only in the context of the overall dynamic analysis. In fact, the economic agents are in some sense in the same situation as the outside analyst. They, too, have to think through the entire dynamics of the economy in order to form their rational expectations.

The dynamic system

To obtain a concise picture of the dynamics, we now show that the model can be reduced to two coupled differential equations in capital and consumption per unit of effective labor. Thus, the key dynamic variables are $\tilde{k} \equiv K/(TL)$ and $\tilde{c} \equiv C/(TL) \equiv c/T$. Using the rule for the growth rate of a fraction, we get

\[
\dot{\tilde{k}} \equiv \frac{\dot{K}}{K} = \frac{\dot{T}}{T} - \frac{\dot{L}}{L} = \frac{\dot{K}}{K} - (g + n) \quad \text{(from (7.2) and (7.19))}
\]

\[
= \frac{F(K, TL) - C - \delta K}{K} - (g + n) \quad \text{(from (7.26))}
\]

\[
= \frac{f(\tilde{k}) - \tilde{c}}{\tilde{k}} - (\delta + g + n) \quad \text{(from (7.23)).}
\]

The differential equation for $\tilde{c}$ is obtained in a similar way:

\[
\dot{\tilde{c}} \equiv \frac{\dot{C}}{C} = \frac{\dot{T}}{T} - \frac{\dot{L}}{L} = \frac{1}{\theta}(r_t - \rho) - g \quad \text{(from the Keynes-Ramsey rule)}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\theta} \left[ f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - \rho - \theta g \right] \tilde{c} \quad \text{(from (7.24)).}
\]

Thus, we end up with the dynamic system

\[
\dot{\tilde{k}} = f(\tilde{k}) - \tilde{c} - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}, \quad (7.27)
\]

\[
\dot{\tilde{c}} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left[ f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - \rho - \theta g \right] \tilde{c}. \quad (7.28)
\]
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The lower panel of Fig. 7.1 shows the phase diagram of the system. The curve OEB represents the points where \( \dot{k} = 0 \); from (7.27) we see that

\[ \dot{k} = 0 \text{ for } \dot{c} = f(\tilde{k}) - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k} \equiv \dot{c}(\tilde{k}). \]  
(7.29)

The upper panel of Fig. 7.1 illustrates how these values \( \dot{c}(\tilde{k}) \) arise as the vertical distance between the curve \( \tilde{y} = f(\tilde{k}) \) and the line \( \tilde{y} = (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k} \) (to save space the proportions are distorted).\(^7\) The maximum value of \( \dot{c}(\tilde{k}) \) is reached at the point where the tangent to the OEB curve in the lower panel is horizontal, i.e., where \( \dot{c}(\tilde{k}) = f'(\tilde{k}) - (\delta + g + n) = 0 \). By definition, the value of \( \tilde{k} \) which satisfies this is the golden rule capital intensity, \( \tilde{k}_{GR} \), and so

\[ f'(\tilde{k}_{GR}) - \delta = g + n. \]  
(7.30)

From (7.27) we see that for points above the \( \dot{k} = 0 \) locus we have \( \dot{c} < 0 \), whereas for points below the \( \dot{k} = 0 \) locus, \( \dot{c} > 0 \). The horizontal arrows in the figure indicate these directions of movement.

From (7.28) we see that

\[ \dot{c} = 0 \text{ for } f'(\tilde{k}) = \delta + \rho + \theta g \quad \text{or} \quad \dot{c} = 0. \]  
(7.31)

Let \( \tilde{k}^* > 0 \) satisfy the equation \( f'(\tilde{k}^*) = \delta + \rho + \theta g \). Then the vertical line \( \tilde{k} = \tilde{k}^* \) represents points where \( \dot{c} = 0 \) (and so does the horizontal half-line \( \dot{c} = 0, \tilde{k} \geq 0 \)). For points to the left of the \( \tilde{k} = \tilde{k}^* \) line we have, according to (7.28), \( \dot{c} > 0 \) and for points to the right of the \( \tilde{k} = \tilde{k}^* \) line we have \( \dot{c} < 0 \). The vertical arrows indicate these directions of movement.

**Steady state**

The point E has coordinates \((\tilde{k}^*, \tilde{c}^*)\) and represents the unique steady state.\(^8\) From (7.31) and (7.29) follows that

\[ f'(\tilde{k}^*) = \delta + \rho + \theta g, \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{c}^* = f(\tilde{k}^*) - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}^*. \]  
(7.32)

\[ \tilde{c}^* = f(\tilde{k}^*) - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}^*. \]  
(7.33)

\(^7\)As the graph is drawn, \( f(0) = 0 \), i.e., capital is assumed essential. But none of the conclusions we are going to consider depends on this.

\(^8\)We note that (7.31) shows that if \( \tilde{c}_t = 0 \), then \( \tilde{c} = 0 \). Therefore, point B in Fig. 7.1 is also mathematically a stationary point of the dynamic system. And if \( f(0) = 0 \), then, according to (7.29), the point O in Fig. 7.1 is also a stationary point. But these stationary points have zero consumption forever and are therefore not steady states of any economic system.

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From (7.32) it can be seen that the real interest rate in steady state is
\[ r^* = f'(\tilde{k}^*) - \delta = \rho + \theta g. \] (7.34)

The capital intensity satisfying this equation is known as the modified golden rule capital intensity, \( \tilde{k}_{MGR} \). The modified golden rule is the rule saying that for a representative agent economy to be in steady state, the capital intensity must be such that the net marginal product of capital equals the required rate of return, taking into account the pure rate of time preference, \( \rho \), and the desire for consumption smoothing, measured by \( \theta \). Note that the \( \rho \) of the Ramsey model corresponds to the intergenerational discount rate \( R \) of the Barro model, cf. Chapter 5.

We show below that the steady state is (conditionally) asymptotically stable. But first we have to make sure that the steady state exists and that it is consistent with general equilibrium. The latter requires that it satisfies the household’s transversality condition (7.12). Using \( a_t = K_t/L_t \equiv \tilde{k}_t T_t = \tilde{k}_t T_0 e^{\delta t} \) and \( r_t = f'(\tilde{k}_t) - \delta \), we get
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}_t e^{-\int_{t}^{\infty} (f'(\tilde{k}_s) - \delta - g - n) ds} = 0. \] (7.35)

In steady state \( \tilde{k}_t = \tilde{k}^* \) and \( f'(\tilde{k}_t) - \delta = \rho + \theta g \) for all \( t \) and the condition becomes
\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}^* e^{-(\rho + \theta g - g - n) t} = 0. \]
This is fulfilled if and only if \( \rho + \theta g > g + n \), that is,
\[ \rho - n > (1 - \theta) g. \] (\( ^* \))

This condition ensures that \( U_0 \) is bounded in the steady state (see Appendix B). If \( \theta \geq 1 \), the condition is fulfilled as soon as the effective utility discount rate, \( \rho - n \), is positive. But if \( \theta < 1 \), the condition requires a sufficiently large effective discount rate.

Since the parameter restriction (\( ^* \)) implies \( \rho + \theta g > g + n \), it implies that the steady-state interest rate \( r^* \), cf. (7.34), is higher than the “natural” growth rate, \( g + n \). If this did not hold, we see from (7.12) directly that the transversality condition would fail in the steady state. Indeed, along the steady state path we would have
\[ a_t e^{-r^* t} = a_0 e^{(\sigma + n) t} e^{-r^* t} = k_0 e^{(\sigma + n - r^*) t}, \]
\[ \text{Indeed, in Barro's model we have } 1 + r^* = (1 + R)(1 + g)^\theta, \text{ which, by taking logs on both sides and using first-order Taylor approximations around 1 gives } r^* \approx \ln(1 + r^*) = \ln(1 + R) + \theta \ln(1 + g) \approx R + \theta g. \]

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which would take the value $k_0 > 0$ for all $t \geq 0$ if $r^* = g + n$ and would go to $\infty$ for $t \to \infty$ if $r^* < g + n$. The individual households would be over-saving and each of them would therefore alter their behavior and the steady state could thus not be an equilibrium path. Another way of seeing that $r^* \leq g + n$ can never be an equilibrium in a Ramsey model is to recognize that this condition would make the household’s human wealth infinite because wage income, $wL$, would grow at a rate, $g + n$, at least as high as the real interest rate, $r^*$. But this would motivate an immediate increase in consumption today and so the considered steady-state path would again not be an equilibrium.

Thus, to have a model of interest, from now on we assume that the parameters satisfy the inequality (*). An implication is that the capital
intensity in steady state, $\bar{k}^*$, is less than the golden rule value $\bar{k}_{GR}$. Indeed, $f'(\bar{k}^*) - \delta = \rho + \theta g > g + n = f'(\bar{k}_{GR}) - \delta$, so that $\bar{k}^* < \bar{k}_{GR}$, in view of $f'' < 0$.

So far we have only ensured that if the steady state, $E$, exists, it is consistent with equilibrium. Existence of a steady state — and of the golden rule capital intensity — requires that the marginal productivity of capital is sufficiently sensitive to variation in the capital intensity. We therefore assume

$$\lim_{\bar{k} \to 0} f'(\bar{k}) > \delta + \rho + \theta g > \delta + g + n \geq \lim_{\bar{k} \to \infty} f'(\bar{k}).$$

(A1)

The inequality in the middle is already presumed in view of (\(**\)). The addition of the other two inequalities ensures the existence of both $\bar{k}^* > 0$ and $\bar{k}_{GR} > 0$.\(^\text{10}\) Because $f'(\bar{k}) > 0$ for all $\bar{k} > 0$, it is implicit in (A1) that $\delta + g + n > 0$. Even without deciding on the sign of $n$ (a decreasing workforce cannot be excluded in our days), this seems like a plausible presumption.

**Trajectories in the phase diagram**

A first condition for a path $(\bar{k}_t, \bar{c}_t)$, with $\bar{k}_t > 0$ and $\bar{c}_t > 0$ for all $t \geq 0$, to be a solution to the model is that it satisfies the system of differential equations (7.27)-(7.28). Indeed, it must satisfy (7.27) to be technically feasible and it must satisfy (7.28) to comply with the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Technical feasibility of the path also requires that its initial value for $\bar{k}$ equals the historically given (pre-determined) value $\bar{k}_0 \equiv K_0/(T_0L_0)$. In contrast, for $\bar{c}$ we have no exogenously given initial value. This is because $\bar{c}_0$ is a so-called jump variable or forward-looking variable, by which is meant an endogenous variable which can immediately shift to another value when expectations about the future change. We shall see that the terminal condition (7.35), reflecting the transversality condition of the households, makes up for this lack of an initial condition.

In Fig. 7.1, we have drawn some possible paths that could be solutions as $t$ increases. We are especially interested in the paths which start out at the historically given $\bar{k}_0$, that is, start out at some point on the stippled vertical line in the figure. If the economy starts out with a high value of $\bar{c}$, it will follow a curve like II in the figure. The low level of saving implies that the capital stock goes to zero in finite time (see Appendix C). If the economy starts out with a low level of $\bar{c}$, it will follow a curve like III in the figure. The high level of saving implies that the capital intensity converges to $\bar{\bar{k}}$ which is defined by the condition $f(\bar{\bar{k}}) = (\delta + g + n)\bar{\bar{k}}$. Such a $\bar{\bar{k}}$ exists in

\(^{10}\text{The often presumed Inada conditions, }\lim_{\bar{k} \to 0} f'(\bar{k}) = \infty \text{ and } \lim_{\bar{k} \to \infty} f'(\bar{k}) = 0, \text{ are stricter than (A1) and not necessary here.}\)
view of (A1) and is higher than the golden rule value $\tilde{k}_{GR}$.\(^{11}\) This suggests that there exists an initial level of consumption somewhere in between, which gives a path like $I$. Indeed, since the curve $II$ emerged with a high $\tilde{c}_0$, then by lowering this $\tilde{c}_0$ slightly, a path will emerge in which the maximal value of $\tilde{k}$ on the $\dot{\tilde{k}} = 0$ locus is greater than curve $II$’s maximal $\tilde{k}$ value.\(^{12}\) We continue lowering $\tilde{c}_0$ until the path’s maximal $\tilde{k}$ value is exactly equal to $\tilde{k}^*$. The path which emerges from this, namely the path $I$, starting at the point $A$, is special in that it converges towards the steady-state point $E$. No other path starting at the stippled line, $\tilde{k} = \tilde{k}_0$, has this property. Those starting above $A$ did not, as we just saw. Consider a path starting below $A$, like path $III$. Either this path never reaches the consumption level $\tilde{c}_A$ and then it can not converge to $E$, of course. Or, after a while its consumption level reaches $\tilde{c}_A$, but at the same time it has $\dot{\tilde{k}} > \dot{\tilde{k}}_0$. From then on, as long as $\dot{\tilde{k}} \leq \dot{\tilde{k}}^*$, for every value of $\tilde{c}$ path $III$ has in common with path $I$, path $III$ has a higher $\tilde{k}$ and a lower $\tilde{c}$ than path $I$ (use (7.27) and (7.28)). Hence, path $III$ diverges from point $E$.

Equivalently, had we considered values of $\tilde{k}_0 > \tilde{k}^*$, there would also be a unique value of $\tilde{c}_0$ such that the path starting from $(\tilde{k}_0, \tilde{c}_0)$ would converge to $E$ (see path $IV$ in Fig. 7.1). All other values of $\tilde{c}_0$ would give paths that diverge from $E$.

The point $E$ is a saddle point. By this is meant a steady-state point with the following property: there exists exactly two paths, one from each side of $\tilde{k}^*$, that converge towards the steady-state point; all other paths (in a neighborhood of the steady state) move away from the steady state and asymptotically approach one of the two diverging paths through $E$. The two converging paths together make up the so-called stable arm; on their own they are referred to as saddle paths.\(^{13}\) The two diverging paths (along the dotted North-West and South-East curve in Fig. 7.1) together make up the unstable arm.

\(^{11}\)The latter is seen graphically. More precisely, it follows from $f'(\tilde{k}_{GR}) = \delta + n + g \equiv f(\dot{\tilde{k}})/\tilde{k} > f'(\tilde{k})$, where the inequality is due to $f'' < 0$ and $f(0) \geq 0$.

\(^{12}\)As an implication of the uniqueness theorem for differential equations, two solution paths in the phase plan cannot intersect.

\(^{13}\)A more precise definition of a saddle point, in terms of eigenvalues, is given in Appendix A. There it is also shown that if $\lim_{\tilde{k} \to 0} f'(\tilde{k}) = 0$, then the saddle path on the left side of the steady state in Fig. 7.1 will start out infinitely close to the origin.
The equilibrium path

A solution to the model is a path which is technically feasible and in addition satisfies certain equilibrium properties. In analogy with the definition in discrete time (see Chapter 3) a path \((\hat{k}_t, \hat{c}_t)_{t=0}^\infty\) is called a technically feasible path if (i) the path has \(\hat{k}_t \geq 0\) and \(\hat{c}_t \geq 0\) for all \(t \geq 0\); (ii) it satisfies the accounting equation (7.27); and (iii) it starts out, at \(t = 0\), with the historically given initial capital intensity. An equilibrium path with perfect foresight is then a technically feasible path \((\hat{k}_t, \hat{c}_t)_{t=0}^\infty\) with the properties that the path (a) is consistent with the households’ optimization given their expectations; (b) is consistent with market clearing for all \(t \geq 0\); and (c) has the property that the evolution over time of the pair \((w_t, r_t)\), where \(w_t = \hat{w}(\hat{k}_t)T_t\) and \(r_t = f'(\hat{k}_t) - \delta\), is as expected by the households. The condition (a) in this definition requires the transformed Keynes-Ramsey rule (7.28) and the transversality condition (7.35) to hold for all \(t \geq 0\).

Consider the case where \(0 < \hat{k}_0 < \hat{k}^*\), as illustrated in Fig. 7.1. Then, the path starting at point A and following the saddle path towards the steady state is an equilibrium path because, by construction, it is technically feasible and it has the required properties, (a), (b), and (c). More intuitively: if the households expect an evolution of \(w_t\) and \(r_t\) corresponding to this path (that is, expect a corresponding underlying movement of \(\hat{k}_t\), which we know unambiguously determines \(r_t\) and \(w_t\)), then these expectations will induce a behavior the aggregate result of which is an actual path for \((\hat{k}_t, \hat{c}_t)\) that confirms the expectations. And along this path the households find no reason to correct their behavior because the path allows both the Keynes-Ramsey rule and the transversality condition of the households to be satisfied.

No other path than the saddle path can be an equilibrium. This is because no other path is compatible with the households’ individual utility maximization under perfect foresight. An initial point above point A can be excluded in that the implied path, \(\Pi\), does not satisfy the household’s NPG condition (and, consequently, not at all the transversality condition).\(^1\) Indeed, if the individual household expected an evolution of \(r_t\) and \(w_t\) corresponding to path \(\Pi\), then the household would immediately choose a lower level of consumption, that is, the household would deviate in order not to suffer the same fate as Ponzi (cf. Chapter 6). But so would all other households react. Thus, path \(\Pi\) would not be realized and the expectation that it would can not be a rational expectation.

Likewise, an initial point below point A can be ruled out because the implied path, \(\Pi\), does not satisfy the household’s transversality condition but implies over-saving. Indeed, at some point in the future, say at time \(t_1\),

\(^1\)A formal proof is given in Appendix C.

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the economy’s capital intensity would pass the golden rule value so that for all \( t > t_1, r_t < g + n \). But with a rate of interest below the growth rate of wage income of the household, the present value of human wealth is infinite. This motivates a higher consumption than that along the path. Thus, if the household expects an evolution of \( r_t \) and \( w_t \) corresponding to path III, then the household will immediately deviate and choose a higher initial level of consumption. But so will all other households react; and the expectation that the economy will follow path III, will consequently not be rational.

We have presumed \( 0 < \tilde{k}_0 < \hat{k}^* \). If instead \( \tilde{k}_0 > \hat{k}^* \), the economy would move along the saddle path from above. Paths like V and VI in Fig. 7.1 can be ruled out because they violate the NPG condition and the transversality condition, respectively. With this we have shown:

**PROPOSITION 1** Assume (A1). Let there be a given \( \tilde{k}_0 > 0 \). Then the Ramsey model exhibits a unique equilibrium path, characterized by \( (\tilde{k}_t, \tilde{c}_t) \) converging, for \( t \to \infty \), towards a unique steady state with capital intensity \( \tilde{k}^* \) satisfying \( f'(\hat{k}^*) - \delta = \rho + \theta g \). The steady state has a per capita consumption of \( \tilde{c}^* = f(\hat{k}^*) - (\delta + g + n)\hat{k}^* \), real wage of \( w_t^* = \tilde{w}(\hat{k}^*)T_0 e^{\gamma t} \), and a real interest rate of \( r^* = \rho + \theta g \).

A numerical example, based on 1 year as our time unit: \( \theta = 2, g = 0.02, n = 0.01 \) and \( \rho = 0.01 \). Then, \( r^* = 0.05 > 0.03 = g + n \).

Note that output per capita, \( y_t \equiv Y_t/L_t \equiv \tilde{y}_tT_t \), tends to grow at the rate of technical progress, \( g \) :

\[
\frac{\dot{y}_t}{y_t} = \frac{\dot{\tilde{y}}_t}{\tilde{y}_t} + \frac{\dot{T}_t}{T_t} = \frac{f'(\hat{k}_t)\dot{k}_t}{f(\hat{k}_t)} + g \to g \text{ for } t \to \infty,
\]

in view of \( \dot{k}_t \to 0 \). Likewise, consumption per capita, \( c_t \equiv \tilde{c}_tT_t \), has the growth rate \( \dot{c}_t/c_t = \tilde{c}_t/\tilde{c}_t + g \to g \) for \( t \to \infty \); similarly for the real wage \( w_t \equiv \tilde{w}(\hat{k}_t)T_t \).

**The concept of saddle-point stability**

The steady state of the model is thus globally asymptotically stable for arbitrary initial values of the capital intensity (our diagram only verifies local asymptotic stability, but the extension to global asymptotic stability is verified in Appendix A). If \( \hat{k} \) is hit by a technology shock (corresponding to a shift in \( \tilde{k}_0 \)), the economy will converge toward the same unique steady state as before. At first glance this might seem peculiar considering that the steady state is a saddle point. Such a steady state is unstable for arbitrary initial
values of both variables, \( \tilde{k} \) and \( \tilde{c} \). But the crux of the matter is that only the initial \( \tilde{k} \) is arbitrary, not the initial \( \tilde{c} \). Indeed, the jump variable \( \tilde{c}_0 \) immediately adjusts to the given circumstances. As shown, it adjusts such that the household’s transversality condition under perfect foresight is satisfied. This ensures that the economy is initially on the saddle path, cf. the point A in Fig. 7.1. In the language of differential equations, conditional asymptotic stability is present. The condition that ensures the stability in our case is the transversality condition.

We shall follow the common terminology in macroeconomics and call a steady state of a two-dimensional dynamic system (locally) saddle-point stable if:

1. the steady state is a saddle point;
2. there is one predetermined variable and one jump variable; and
3. the saddle path is not parallel to the jump variable axis.

Thus, to establish saddle-point stability, all three properties must be verified. If for instance point 1 and 2 hold but, contrary to point 3, the saddle path is parallel to the jump variable axis, then saddle-point stability does not exist. Indeed, given that the predetermined variable initially deviated from its steady-state value, it would not be possible to find any initial value of the jump variable such that the solution of the system would converge to the steady state for \( t \to \infty \).

In the present case, we have already verified point 1 and 2. And since the phase diagram shows that the saddle path is not vertical, also point 3 holds. Thus, the Ramsey model is saddle-point stable. In Appendix A it is shown that the positively-sloped saddle path in Fig. 7.1 ranges over all \( \tilde{k} > 0 \) (there is nowhere a vertical asymptote to the saddle path). Hence, the steady state is globally saddle point stable. All in all, these characteristics of the Ramsey model are analogue to those of the Barro model in discrete time when the bequest motive is operative.

### 7.4 Comparative dynamics

#### The role of the key parameters

A striking conclusion is that the real interest rate in the long run is in a simple way determined by the rate of time preference, the elasticity of marginal utility, and the rate of technical progress. A higher \( \rho \), i.e., more impatience
and thereby less willingness to defer consumption, implies less capital accumulation and thus smaller capital intensity and in the long run a higher interest rate and lower consumption than otherwise. The long-run growth rate is unaffected. A higher desire of consumption smoothing, $\theta$, will have the same effect in that it implies that a larger part of the greater consumption opportunities in the future, as brought about by technical progress, will be consumed immediately. The long-run interest rate depends positively on the growth rate of labor productivity, $g$, because the higher this is, the higher is the rate of return needed to induce the saving required to maintain a steady state and to overcome the desire of consumption smoothing. The long-run interest rate is independent of the particular form of the aggregate production function, $f$. This function matters for what capital intensity and what consumption per capita are compatible with the long-run interest rate. This kind of results are specific to representative agent models. This is because only in these models will the Keynes-Ramsey rule hold not only for the individual household, but also at the aggregate level.

Unlike the Solow growth model, the Ramsey model provides a theory of the evolution and long-run level of the rate of saving. The endogenous gross saving rate of the economy is

$$s_t \equiv \frac{Y_t - C_t}{Y_t} = \frac{\dot{K}_t + \delta K_t}{Y_t} = \frac{\dot{K}_t/K_t + \delta}{Y_t/K_t} = \frac{\dot{k}_t/\dot{k}_t + g + n + \delta}{f(\dot{k}_t)/\dot{k}_t} \to \frac{g + n + \delta}{f(k^*)/k^*} = s^* \quad \text{for} \quad t \to \infty. \quad (7.36)$$

By determining the path of $\tilde{k}_t$, the Ramsey model determines how $s_t$ moves over time and adjusts to its constant long-run level. Indeed, since for any given $\tilde{k} > 0$, the equilibrium value of $\tilde{c}_t$ is uniquely determined by the requirement that the economy must be on the saddle path. Since this defines $\tilde{c}_t$ as a function, $\tilde{c}(\tilde{k}_t)$, of $\tilde{k}_t$, there is a corresponding function for the saving rate in that $s_t = 1 - \tilde{c}(\tilde{k}_t)/f(\tilde{k}_t) \equiv s(\tilde{k}_t)$; so $s(\tilde{k}^*) = s^*$.

To see an example of how the long-run saving rate depends on basic parameters, let us consider the case where the production function is Cobb-Douglas:

$$\tilde{y} = f(\tilde{k}) = A\tilde{k}^\alpha, \quad A > 0, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1. \quad (7.37)$$

Then $f'(\tilde{k}) = A\alpha\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1} = \alpha f(\tilde{k})/\tilde{k}$. In steady state we get, by use of the steady-state result (7.32),

$$\frac{f(\tilde{k}^*)}{\tilde{k}^*} = \frac{1}{\alpha} f'(\tilde{k}^*) = \frac{\delta + \rho + \theta g}{\alpha}.$$
7.4. Comparative dynamics

Substitution in (7.36) gives

\[ s^* = \frac{\alpha \delta + g + n}{\delta + \rho + \theta g}. \tag{7.38} \]

Given our parameter restriction (A1), we have \( \rho + \theta g > g + n \), from which follows \( s^* < \alpha \).

We note that the long-run saving rate is a decreasing function of the rate of impatience, \( \rho \), and the desire of consumption smoothing, \( \theta \); it is an increasing function of the capital depreciation rate, \( \delta \), the rate of population growth, \( n \), and the elasticity of production wrt. to capital, \( \alpha \).\(^{15}\) It can be shown (see Appendix D) that if, by coincidence, \( \theta = 1/s^* \), then \( s'(\tilde{k}) = 0 \), that is, the saving rate \( s_t \) is also outside of steady state equal to \( s^* \). In view of (7.38), the condition \( \theta = 1/s^* \) is equivalent to the “knife-edge” condition \( \theta = (\delta + \rho)/(\alpha(\delta + g + n) - g) \equiv \bar{\theta} \). More generally, assuming \( \alpha(\delta + g + n) > g \) (which seems likely empirically), we have that if \( \theta \leq 1/s^* \) (i.e., \( \theta \leq \bar{\theta} \)), then \( s'(\tilde{k}) \leq 0 \), respectively (and if instead \( \alpha(\delta + g + n) \leq g \), then \( s'(\tilde{k}) < 0 \), unconditionally).\(^{16}\) Data presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 15) indicate no trend for the US saving rate, but a positive trend for several other developed countries since 1870. One interpretation is that whereas the US has been close to its steady state, the other countries are still in the adjustment process toward the steady state. As an example, consider the parameter values \( \delta = 0.05 \), \( \rho = 0.02 \), \( g = 0.02 \) and \( n = 0.01 \). In this case we get \( \bar{\theta} = 10 \) if \( \alpha = 0.33 \); given \( \theta < 10 \), these other countries should then have \( s'(\tilde{k}) < 0 \) which, according to the model, is compatible with a rising saving rate over time only if these countries are approaching their steady state from above (i.e., they should have \( \tilde{k}_0 > \tilde{k}^* \)). It may be argued that \( \alpha \) should also reflect the role of education and R&D in production and thus be higher; with \( \alpha = 0.75 \) we get \( \bar{\theta} = 1.75 \). Then, if \( \theta > 1.75 \), these countries would have \( s'(\tilde{k}) > 0 \) and thus approach their steady state from below (i.e., \( k_0 < \tilde{k}^* \)).\(^{17}\)

Solow’s growth model as a special case

The above results give a hint that Solow’s growth model, with a given constant saving rate \( s \in (0, 1) \) and given \( \delta \), \( g \), and \( n \) (with \( \delta + g + n > 0 \)), can,

\(^{15}\)Partial differentiation wrt. \( g \) yields \( \partial s^*/\partial g = \alpha(\rho - \theta n - (\theta - 1)\delta)/(\delta + \rho + \theta g)^2 \), the sign of which cannot be determined in general.

\(^{16}\)See Appendix D.

\(^{17}\)Cho and Graham (1996) consider the empirical question whether countries tend to be above or below their steady state. They find that on average, countries with a relatively low income per adult are above their steady state and countries with a higher income are below.

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under certain circumstances, be interpreted as a special case of the Ramsey model. The Solow model is given by

\[
\dot{\tilde{k}}_t = sf(\tilde{k}_t) - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_t.
\]

The constant saving rate implies proportionality between consumption and income which, in growth-corrected terms, per capita consumption is

\[
\tilde{c}_t = (1 - s)f(\tilde{k}_t).
\]

For the Ramsey model to yield this, the production function must be like in (7.37) (i.e., Cobb-Douglas) with \(\alpha > s\). And the elasticity of marginal utility, \(\theta\), must satisfy \(\theta = \frac{1}{s}\). Finally, the rate of time preference, \(\rho\), must be such that (7.38) holds with \(s^*\) replaced by \(s\), which implies \(\rho = \alpha(\delta + g + n)/s - \delta - \theta g\). It remains to show that this \(\rho\) satisfies the inequality, \(\rho - n > (1 - \theta)g\), which is necessary for existence of an equilibrium in the Ramsey model. Since \(\alpha/s > 1\), the chosen \(\rho\) satisfies \(\rho > \delta + g + n - \delta - \theta g = n + (1 - \theta)g\), which was to be proved. Thus, in this case the Ramsey model generates an equilibrium which implies a time path identical to that generated by the Solow model with \(s = 1/\theta\).18

With this foundation of the Solow model, it will always hold that \(s = s^* < s_{GR}\), where \(s_{GR}\) is the golden rule saving rate. Indeed, from (7.36) and (7.30), respectively,

\[
s_{GR} = \frac{(\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_{GR}}{f(\tilde{k}_{GR})} = \frac{f'(\tilde{k}_{GR})\tilde{k}_{GR}}{f(\tilde{k}_{GR})} = \alpha > s^*,
\]

from the Cobb-Douglas specification and (7.38), respectively.

### 7.5 A social planner’s problem

Another implication of the Ramsey setup is that the decentralized market equilibrium (within the idealized presumptions of the model) brings about the same allocation of resources as would a social planner with the same criterion function as the representative household. As in Chapter 5, by a social planner we mean a central authority who is “all-knowing and all-powerful”. The social planner is not constrained by other limitations than those deriving from technology and initial resources and can thus fully decide on the resource allocation within these confines.

18A more elaborate account of the Solow model as a special case of the Ramsey model is given in Appendix D.
Let the economy be closed and let the social planner have a social welfare function which is time separable with constant elasticity, \( \hat{\theta} \), of marginal utility and a pure rate of time preference \( \hat{\rho} \). Then the social planner’s optimization problem is

\[
\max_{(c_t)_{t=0}} \ W_0 = \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{\hat{c}_t^{1-\hat{\theta}} - 1}{1 - \hat{\theta}} e^{-(\hat{\rho} - n)t} dt \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (7.39)
\]

\[
c_t \geq 0, \quad (7.40)
\]

\[
\dot{\hat{k}}_t = f(\hat{k}_t) - \frac{c_t}{\bar{T}_t} - (\delta + g + n)\hat{k}_t, \quad (7.41)
\]

\[
\hat{k}_t \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } t \geq 0. \quad (7.42)
\]

We assume \( \hat{\theta} > 0 \) and \( \hat{\rho} - n > (1 - \hat{\theta})g \). In case \( \hat{\theta} = 1 \), the expression \((c_t^{1-\hat{\theta}} - 1) / (1 - \hat{\theta})\) should be interpreted as in \(c_t\). The dynamic constraint (7.41) essentially reflects the national product account. Because the economy is closed, the social planner does not have the opportunity of borrowing or lending from abroad and hence there is no solvency requirement. Instead we just impose the definitional constraint (7.42) of non-negativity of the state variable \( \hat{k} \). The problem is the continuous time analogue of the social planner’s problem in discrete time in Section 5.4. Note, however, a minor conceptual difference, namely that in continuous time there is in the short run no upper bound on the flow variable \( c_t \), that is, no bound like \( c_t \leq T f(\hat{k}_t - (\delta + g + n)\hat{k}_t) \). A consumption intensity \( c_t \) which is higher than the right-hand side of this inequality, will just be reflected in a negative value of the flow variable \( \dot{\hat{k}}_t \).

To solve the problem we use the Maximum Principle. The current-value Hamiltonian is

\[
H(\hat{k}, c, \lambda, t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\hat{\theta}} - 1}{1 - \hat{\theta}} + \lambda \left[ f(\hat{k}) - \frac{c_t}{\bar{T}_t} - (\delta + g + n)\hat{k}_t \right],
\]

where \( \lambda \) is the adjoint variable associated with the dynamic constraint (7.41). An interior optimal path \((\hat{k}_t, c_t)_{t=0}^{\infty}\) will satisfy that there exists a continuous flow variable \( \dot{\hat{k}}_t \).

\[\text{As usual, we presume that capital can be “eaten”. That is, we consider the capital good to be instantaneously convertible to a consumption good. Otherwise there would be at any time an upper bound on } c, \text{ namely } c \leq T f(\hat{k}), \text{ saying that the per capita consumption flow cannot exceed the per capita output flow. The role of such constraints is discussed in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986).}\]
function $\lambda = \lambda(t)$ such that, for all $t \geq 0$,
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial c} = e^{-\hat{\theta}} - \frac{\lambda}{T} = 0, \text{ i.e., } e^{-\hat{\theta}} = \frac{\lambda}{T}, \quad \text{and} \quad (7.43)
\]
\[
\frac{\partial H}{\partial k} = \lambda(f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - g - n) = (\hat{\rho} - n)\lambda - \dot{\lambda} \quad (7.44)
\]
hold along the path and the transversality condition,
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}_t \lambda_t e^{-(\hat{\rho} - n)t} = 0, \quad (7.45)
\]
is satisfied.\footnote{Although the infinite-horizon Maximum principle itself does not guarantee validity of such a straightforward extension of a necessary transversality condition from finite horizon to infinite horizon, this extension is valid for the present problem, cf. Appendix E.}

The condition (7.43) can be seen as a $MC = MB$ condition and illustrates that $\lambda_t$ is the shadow price, measured in terms of current utility, of $\tilde{k}_t$ along the optimal path.\footnote{Decreasing $c_t$ by one unit, increases $\tilde{k}_t$ by $1/T_t$ units, each of which are worth $\lambda_t$ to the social planner.} The differential equation (7.44) tells us how this shadow price evolves over time. The transversality condition, (8.47), together with (7.43), entails the condition
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}_t \lambda_t e^{-(\hat{\rho} - n)t} = 0,
\]
where the unimportant factor $T_0$ has been eliminated. Imagine the opposite were true, namely that $\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}_t \lambda_t e^{-(\hat{\rho} - n)t} > 0$. Then, intuitively $U_0$ could be increased by reducing the long-run value of $\tilde{k}_t$, i.e., consume more and save less.

By taking logs in (7.43) and differentiating wrt. $t$, we get $-\hat{\theta} \dot{c}/c = \hat{\rho}/\lambda - g$. Inserting (7.44) and rearranging gives the condition
\[
\dot{\hat{c}}/\hat{c} = 1/\hat{\theta}(g - \hat{\lambda}/\lambda) = 1/\hat{\theta}(f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - \hat{\rho}). \quad (7.46)
\]
This is the social planner’s Keynes-Ramsey rule. If the rate of time preference, $\hat{\rho}$, is lower than the net marginal product of capital, $f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta$, the social planner will let per capita consumption be relatively low in the beginning in order to enjoy greater per capita consumption later. The lower the impatience relative to the return on capital accumulation, the more favorable it becomes to defer consumption.

Because $\hat{c} \equiv c/T$, we get from (8.48) qualitatively the same differential equation for $\hat{c}$ as we obtained in the decentralized market economy. And
the dynamic resource constraint (7.41) is of course the same as that of the
decentralized market economy. Thus, the dynamics are in principle unaltered and
the phase diagram in Fig. 7.1 is still valid. The solution of the social
planner implies that the economy will move along the saddle path towards
the steady state. This trajectory, path I in the diagram, satisfies both the
first-order conditions and the transversality condition. However, paths such as
III in the figure do not satisfy the transversality condition of the social
planner but imply permanent over-saving. And paths such as II in the
figure will experience a sudden end when all the capital has been used up;
they cannot be optimal. Appendix E provides a more rigorous argument for
this, namely that the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in \((\tilde{k}, \tilde{c})\). Thence, not
only is the saddle path an optimal solution, it is the only optimal solution.

Comparing with the market solution of the previous section, we have
established:

**PROPOSITION 2** (equivalence theorem) Assume (A1) holds with \(\theta\) and \(\rho\)
replaced by \(\hat{\theta}\) and \(\hat{\rho}\), respectively. Let there be a given \(k_0 > 0\). Then the
perfectly competitive market economy, without externalities, brings about
the same resource allocation as that brought about by a social planner with
the same criterion function as the representative household, i.e., with \(\hat{\theta} = \theta\)
and \(\hat{\rho} = \rho\).

This is a continuous time analogue to the discrete time equivalence theorem
of Chapter 5.

The capital intensity \(\hat{k}\) in the social planner’s solution will not converge
towards the golden rule level, \(\hat{k}_{GR}\), but towards a level whose distance to the
golden rule level depends on how much \(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\theta}g\) exceeds the natural growth
rate, \(g + n\). Even if society would be able to consume more in the long term
if it aimed for the golden rule level, this would not compensate for the re-
duction in current consumption which would be necessary to achieve it. This
consumption is relatively more valuable, the greater is the social planner’s
effective rate of time preference, \(\hat{\rho} - n\). In line with the market economy, the
social planner’s solution ends up in a modified golden rule. In the long term,
net marginal productivity of capital is determined by preference parameters
and productivity growth and equals \(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\theta}g > g + n\). Hereafter, given the net
marginal productivity of capital, the capital intensity and the level of the
consumption path is determined by the production function.

**Average utilitarianism**

In the above analysis, the social planner maximizes the sum of discounted per
capita utilities *weighted* by generation size; this is called discounted *classical*
utilitarianism. As an implication, the effective utility discount rate, \( \rho - n \), varies negatively (one to one) with the population growth rate. Since this corresponds to how the per capita rate of return on saving, \( r - n \), is “diluted” by population growth, the net marginal product of capital in steady state becomes independent of \( n \), namely equal to \( \hat{\rho} + \hat{\theta}g \).

An alternative to discounted classical utilitarianism is to maximize discounted per capita utility which is called discounted average utilitarianism. Here the social planner maximizes the sum of discounted per capita utilities without weighing by generation size. Then the effective utility discount rate is independent of the population growth rate, \( n \). With \( \hat{\rho} \) still denoting the pure rate of time preference, the criterion function becomes

\[
W_0 = \int_0^\infty \frac{c_1^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} dt.
\]

The social planner’s solution then converges towards a steady state with the net marginal product of capital

\[
f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta = \hat{\rho} + n + \hat{\theta}g.
\] (7.47)

Here, an increase in \( n \) will increase the long-run net marginal product of capital, everything else equal.

The representative Ramsey household in an economy where the market mechanism rules may of course also have a criterion function in line with discounted average utilitarianism, that is, \( U_0 = \int_0^\infty u(c_t)e^{-\rho t} dt \). Then, the interest rate in the economy will in the long run be \( r^* = \rho + n + \theta g \) and so an increase in \( n \) will increase \( r^* \).

**Ramsey’s zero discount rate and the overtaking criterion**

It was mostly the perspective of a social planner, rather than the market mechanism, which was at the center of Ramsey’s own analysis. Ramsey maintained that the social planner should “not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination” (Ramsey 1928). Ramsey also assumed \( g = n = 0 \). Given the instantaneous utility function \( u \), with \( u' > 0, u'' < 0 \), and given \( \rho = 0 \), Ramsey’s problem was:

\[
\max_{(c_t)_{t=0}^\infty} W_0 = \int_0^\infty u(c_t) dt \quad \text{s.t.}
\]

\[
c_t \geq 0,
\]

\[
\dot{k}_t = f(k_t) - c_t - \delta k_t,
\]

\[
k_t \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } t \geq 0.
\]

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7.5. A social planner’s problem

Since the improper integral $W_0$ will generally not be bounded in this case, Ramsey could not use maximization of $W_0$ as an optimality criterion. Instead he used a criterion akin to the overtaking criterion we considered in the last part of Chapter 5. We only have to reformulate this criterion in a continuous time setting. Let $(c_t)_{t=0}^\infty$ be the consumption path associated with an arbitrary technically feasible path and let $(\hat{c}_t)$ be the consumption path associated with our candidate as an optimal path, that is, the path we wish to test for optimality. Define

$$D_T \equiv \int_0^T u(\hat{c}_t)dt - \int_0^T u(c_t)dt. \quad (7.48)$$

Then the feasible path $(\hat{c}_t)_{t=0}^\infty$ is overtaking optimal, if for any alternative feasible path, $(c_t)_{t=0}^\infty$, there exists a number $T' \geq 0$ such that $D_T \geq 0$ for all $T \geq T'$. That is, if from some date on, cumulative utility of the candidate path up to all later dates is greater than that of any alternative feasible path, then the candidate path is overtaking optimal. We say it is weakly preferred in case we just know that $D_T \geq 0$ for all $T \geq T'$. If $D_T \geq 0$ can be replaced by $D_T > 0$, we say it is strictly preferred.

Optimal control theory is also applicable with this criterion. The Hamiltonian is

$$H(k, c, \lambda, t) = u(c) + \lambda [f(k) - c - \delta k].$$

The Maximum Principle states that an interior overtaking-optimal path will satisfy that there exists an adjoint variable $\lambda$ such that for all $t \geq 0$ it holds along this path that

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial c} = u'(c) - \lambda = 0, \quad \text{and} \quad (7.49)$$

$$\frac{\partial H}{\partial k} = \lambda (f'(k) - \delta) = -\dot{\lambda}. \quad (7.50)$$

The Keynes-Ramsey rule now becomes

$$\frac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} = \frac{1}{\theta(c_t)} (f'(k_t) - \delta), \quad \text{where} \quad \theta(c) \equiv -\frac{c}{u'(c)} u''(c).$$

One might conjecture that the transversality condition,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} k_t \lambda_t = 0, \quad (7.51)$$

is also necessary for optimality but, as we will see below, this turns out to be wrong in this case with no discounting.

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Our assumption (A1) here reduces to \( \lim_{k \to 0} f'(k) > \delta > \lim_{k \to \infty} f'(k) \). Apart from this, the phase diagram is fully analogue to that in Fig. 7.1, except that the steady state, \( E \), is now at the top of the \( \dot{k} = 0 \) curve. This is because in steady state, \( f'(k^*) - \delta = 0 \), and this equation also defines \( k_{GR} \) in this case. By the same method as that used to prove Proposition 4 in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5), it can be shown that the saddle path is again the unique solution to the optimization problem.

The interesting feature is that in this case the Ramsey model constitutes a counterexample to the widespread presumption that an optimal plan must satisfy a transversality condition like (7.51). Indeed, by (7.49), \( \lambda_t = u'(c_t) \to u'(c^*) \) for \( t \to \infty \) along the overtaking-optimal path (the saddle path).

Thus, instead of (7.51), we get

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} k_t \lambda_t = u'(c^*) k^* > 0.
\]

With CRRA utility it is straightforward to generalize these results to the case \( g \geq 0, n \geq 0 \) and \( \hat{p} - n = (1 - \theta) g \). The social planner’s overtaking-optimal solution is still the saddle path approaching the golden rule steady state; and this solution violates the “natural” transversality condition. What we learn from this is that an infinite horizon and the golden rule are sometimes associated with remarkably distinct results.

Note also that with zero effective utility discounting, there can not be equilibrium in the market economy version of this story. The real interest rate would in the long run be zero and thus the human wealth of the infinitely-lived household would be infinite. But then the demand for consumption goods would be unbounded and equilibrium thus be impossible.

### 7.6 Concluding remarks

The Ramsey model has played an important role as a way of structuring economists’ thoughts about many macrodynamic phenomena including economic growth. The model should not be considered directly descriptive but rather as an examination of a benchmark case. As noted in the introduction this case is in some sense the opposite of the Diamond OLG model. Both models build on very idealized assumptions. Whereas the Diamond model ignores any bequest motive and emphasizes life-cycle behavior and heterogeneity of the population, the Ramsey model implicitly assumes an altruistic bequest motive which is always operative and which turns households into homogeneous, infinitely-lived agents. In this way the Ramsey model ends up as an easy-to-apply framework, implying, among other things, a clear-cut
theory of the real interest rate in the long run. The model’s usefulness lies in allowing general equilibrium analysis of an array of problems in a “vacuum”.

The next chapter presents examples of different applications of the Ramsey model. Because of the model’s simplicity, one should always be aware of the risk of non-robust conclusions. The assumption of a representative household is one of the main limitations of the Ramsey model. It is not easy to endow the dynasty portrait of households with plausibility. One of the problems is, as argued by Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), that this portrait does not comply with the fact that families are interconnected in a complex way via marriage of partners coming from different parent families. And the lack of heterogeneity in the model’s population of households implies a danger that important interdependencies between different classes of agents are unduly neglected. For some problems these interdependencies may be only of secondary importance, but for others (for instance, public debt issues) they are crucial. Another critical limitation of the model comes from its reliance on saddle-point stability with the associated presumption of perfect foresight infinitely far out in the future. There can be good reasons for bearing in mind the following warning (by Solow, 1990, p. 221) against overly reliance on the Ramsey framework in the analysis of a market economy:

“The problem is not just that perfect foresight into the indefinite future is so implausible away from steady states. The deeper problem is that in practice — if there is any practice — miscalculations about the equilibrium path may not reveal themselves for a long time. The mistaken path gives no signal that it will be "ultimately" infeasible. It is natural to comfort oneself: whenever the error is perceived there will be a jump to a better approximation to the converging arm. But a large jump may be required. In a decentralized economy it will not be clear who knows what, or where the true converging arm is, or, for that matter, exactly where we are now, given that some agents (speculators) will already have perceived the need for a mid-course correction while others have not. This thought makes it hard even to imagine what a long-run path would look like. It strikes me as more or less devastating for the interpretation of quarterly data as the solution of an infinite time optimization problem.”

7.7 Bibliographical notes

1. Frank Ramsey died at the age of 26 but he published several important articles. Ramsey discussed economic issues with, among others, John Maynard Keynes. In

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an obituary published in the Economic Journal (March 1932) some months after
Ramsey’s death, Keynes described Ramsey’s article about the optimal savings
as “one of the most remarkable contributions to mathematical economics ever
made, both in respect of the intrinsic importance and difficulty of its subject, the
power and elegance of the technical methods employed, and the clear purity of
illumination with which the writer’s mind is felt by the reader to play about its
subject”.

2. The version of the Ramsey model we have considered is in accordance with
the general tenet of neoclassical preference theory: saving is motivated only by
higher consumption in the future. Other versions assume accumulation of wealth
is also motivated by a desire for social prestige and economic and political power
rather than consumption. In Kurz (1968b) an extended Ramsey model is studied
where wealth is an independent argument in the instantaneous utility function.

3. The equivalence in the Ramsey model between the decentralized market
equilibrium and the social planner’s solution can be seen as an extension of the
first welfare theorem as it is known from elementary textbooks, to the case where
the market structure stretches infinitely far out in time, and the finite number
of economic agents (families) face an infinite time horizon: in the absence of
externalities etc., the allocation of resources under perfect competition will lead to
a Pareto optimal allocation. The Ramsey model is indeed a special case in that all
households are identical. But the result can be shown in a far more general setup,
cf. Debreu (1954). The result, however, does not hold in overlapping generations
models where new generations enter and the “interests” of the new households
have not been accounted for in advance.

7.8 Appendix

A. Algebraic analysis of the dynamics around the steady state

In order to supplement the graphical approach of Section 7.3 with an exact
analysis of the adjustment dynamics of the model, we compute the Jacobian
matrix for the system of differential equations (7.27) - (7.28):

\[
J(\tilde{k}, \tilde{c}) = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{\partial \tilde{k}}{\partial \tilde{k}} & \frac{\partial \tilde{k}}{\partial \tilde{c}} \\
\frac{\partial \tilde{c}}{\partial \tilde{k}} & \frac{\partial \tilde{c}}{\partial \tilde{c}}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{1}{\beta} f''(\tilde{k}) & -1 \\
\frac{1}{\beta}(f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - \rho + \theta g)
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Evaluated in the steady state this reduces to

\[
J(\tilde{k}^*, \tilde{c}^*) = \begin{bmatrix}
\rho - n - (1 - \theta)g & -1 \\
\frac{1}{\beta} f''(\tilde{k}^*) \tilde{c}^* & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

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This matrix has the determinant
\[
\frac{1}{\theta} f''(\tilde{k}^*) \tilde{c}^* < 0.
\]

Since the product of the eigenvalues of the matrix equals the determinant, the eigenvalues are real and opposite in sign.

A steady-state point in a two dimensional continuous-time dynamic system is called a saddle point if the associated eigenvalues are opposite in sign.\textsuperscript{22} For the present case we conclude that the steady state is a saddle point. This mathematical definition of a saddle point is equivalent to that given in the text of Section 7.3. Indeed, with two eigenvalues of opposite sign, there exists, in a small neighborhood of the steady state, a stable arm consisting of two saddle paths which point in opposite directions. From the phase diagram in Fig. 7.1 we know that the stable arm has a positive slope. Thus, for \( \tilde{k}_0 \) sufficiently close to \( \tilde{k}^* \) it is possible to start out on a saddle path. Consequently, there is a (unique) value of \( \tilde{c}_0 \) such that \((\tilde{k}_t, \tilde{c}_t) \to (\tilde{k}^*, \tilde{c}^*)\) for \( t \to \infty \). Finally, the dynamic system has exactly one jump variable, \( \tilde{c} \), and one predetermined variable, \( \tilde{k} \). It follows that the steady state is (locally) saddle-point stable.

We claim that for the present model this can be strengthened to global saddle-point stability. That is, our claim is that for any \( \tilde{k}_0 > 0 \), it is possible to start out on a saddle path. For \( 0 < \tilde{k}_0 \leq \tilde{k}^* \), this is obvious in that the extension of the saddle path towards the left reaches the y-axis at a non-negative value of \( \tilde{c}^* \). That is to say that the extension of the saddle path cannot, according to the uniqueness theorem for differential equations, intersect the \( \tilde{k} \)-axis for \( \tilde{k} > 0 \) in that the positive part of the \( \tilde{k} \)-axis is a solution of (7.27) - (7.28).\textsuperscript{23}

For \( \tilde{k}_0 > \tilde{k}^* \), our claim can be verified in the following way: suppose, contrary to our claim, that there exists a \( \tilde{k}_1 > \tilde{k}^* \) such that the saddle path does not intersect that region of the positive quadrant where \( \tilde{k} \geq \tilde{k}_1 \). Let \( \tilde{k}_1 \) be chosen as the smallest possible value with this property. The slope, \( d\tilde{c}/d\tilde{k} \), of the saddle path will then have no upper bound when \( \tilde{k} \) approaches \( \tilde{k}_1 \) from the left. Instead \( \tilde{c} \) will approach \( \infty \) along the saddle path. But then \( \ln \tilde{c} \) will also approach \( \infty \) along the saddle path for \( \tilde{k} \to \tilde{k}_1 \) (\( \tilde{k} < \tilde{k}_1 \)). It follows that

\textsuperscript{22} Note the difference compared to the discrete time system in Appendix F of Chapter 5. In the discrete time system we have next period’s \( \tilde{k} \) and \( \tilde{c} \) on the left-hand side of the dynamic equations, not the increase in \( \tilde{k} \) and \( \tilde{c} \), respectively. Therefore, the criterion for a saddle point is different in discrete time.

\textsuperscript{23} Because the extension of the saddle path towards the left in Fig. 7.1 can not intersect the \( \tilde{c} \)-axis at a value of \( \tilde{c} > f(0) \), it follows that if \( f(0) = 0 \), the extension of the saddle path ends up in the origin.
\( d \ln \tilde{c} / d \tilde{k} = (d \tilde{c} / d \tilde{k}) / \tilde{c} \), computed along the saddle path, will have no upper bound. Nevertheless, we have

\[
\frac{d \ln \tilde{c}}{dk} = \frac{\dot{\tilde{c}} / \tilde{c}}{\dot{\tilde{k}}} = \frac{1}{\tilde{k}} (f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta - \rho - \theta g)
\]

When \( \tilde{k} \to \tilde{k}_1 \) and \( \tilde{c} \to \infty \), the numerator in this expression is bounded, while the denominator will approach \(-\infty\). Consequently, \( d \ln \tilde{c} / d \tilde{k} \) will approach zero from above, as \( \tilde{k} \to \tilde{k}_1 \). But this contradicts that \( d \ln \tilde{c} / d \tilde{k} \) has no upper bound, when \( \tilde{k} \to \tilde{k}_1 \). Thus, the assumption that such a \( \tilde{k}_1 \) exists is false and our original hypothesis holds true.

### B. Boundedness of the utility integral

We claimed in Section 7.3 that if the parameter restriction

\[
\rho - n > (1 - \theta)g
\]

holds, then the utility integral is bounded in the steady state. To avoid irrelevant constants in the integrand to disturb the issue, we replace \( u(c) = (c^{1-\theta} - 1)/(1-\theta) \) by \( \tilde{u}(c) = u(c) + 1/(1-\theta) = c^{1-\theta}/(1-\theta) \). This is always a legitimate transformation, since only relative marginal utilities matter for the household’s behavior. Thus we shall examine whether \( \tilde{U}_0 = \int_0^\infty c^{1-\theta} e^{-(\rho-n) t} dt \) is bounded along the steady-state path, \( c_t = \tilde{c}^* T_t \). For \( \theta \neq 1 \),

\[
(1-\theta) \tilde{U}_0 = \int_0^\infty c_t^{1-\theta} e^{-(\rho-n) t} dt = \int_0^\infty (c_0 e^{gt})^{1-\theta} e^{-(\rho-n) t} dt = c_0 \int_0^\infty e^{((1-\theta)g - (\rho-n)) t} dt = \frac{c_0}{\rho - n - (1-\theta) g}, \tag{7.52}
\]

by (*) . If \( \theta = 1 \), we get

\[
\tilde{U}_0 = \int_0^\infty (\ln c_0 + gt) e^{-(\rho-n) t} dt,
\]

which is also finite, in view of (*) implying \( \rho - n > 0 \) in this case. It follows that also any path converging to the steady state will entail bounded utility, when (*) holds.

On the other hand, suppose that (*) does not hold, i.e., \( \rho - n \leq (1 - \theta)g \). Then by (7.52) and \( c_0 > 0 \) follows that \( \tilde{U}_0 = \infty \).
C. The diverging paths

In Section 7.3 we stated that paths of types II and III in the phase diagram in Fig. 7.1 can not be equilibria with perfect foresight. Given the expectation corresponding to any of these paths, every single household will choose to deviate from the expected path (i.e., deviate from the expected “average behavior” in the economy). We will now show this formally.

We first consider a path of type III. A path of this type will, according to (7.28), not be able to reach the horizontal axis in Fig. 7.1 (cf. the uniqueness theorem for differential equations). Instead it will converge towards the point \((\tilde{k}, 0)\) for \(t \to \infty\). This implies \(\lim_{t \to \infty} r_t = f'(\tilde{k}) - \delta < g + n\), because \(\tilde{k} > \tilde{k}_{GR}\). So,

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} a_t e^{-\int_0^t (r_s - g - n) ds} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{k}_t e^{-\int_0^t (f'(\tilde{k}_s) - \delta - g - n) ds} = \tilde{k} e^{\infty} > 0.
\]

Hence the transversality condition of the households is violated. Consequently, the household will choose higher consumption than along this path and can do so without violating the NPG condition.

Consider now instead a path of type I. We shall first show that if the economy follows such a path, then depletion of all capital occurs in finite time. Indeed, it is clear that any path of type I will pass the \(\cdot \tilde{k} = 0\) locus in Fig. 7.1. Let \(t_0\) be the point in time where this occurs. If path I lies above the \(\tilde{k} = 0\) locus for all \(t \geq 0\), then we set \(t_0 = 0\). For \(t > t_0\), we have

\[
\dot{\tilde{k}}_t = f(\tilde{k}_t) - \ddot{c}_t - (\delta + g + n) \tilde{k}_t < 0.
\]

By differentiation wrt. \(t\) we get

\[
\ddot{\tilde{k}}_t = f'(\tilde{k}_t) \dot{\tilde{k}}_t - \ddot{c}_t - (\delta + g + n) \tilde{k}_t = [f'(\tilde{k}_t) - \delta - g - n] \dot{\tilde{k}}_t - \ddot{c}_t < 0,
\]

where the inequality comes from \(\dot{\tilde{k}}_t < 0\) combined with \(\ddot{c}_t < \ddot{k}_{GR} \Rightarrow f'(\tilde{k}_t) - \delta > f'(\tilde{k}_{GR}) - \delta = g + n\). Therefore, there exists a \(t_1 > t_0 \geq 0\) such that

\[
\tilde{k}_{t_1} = \tilde{k}_{t_0} + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \dot{\tilde{k}}_t dt = 0,
\]

as was to be shown. At time \(t_1\), \(\tilde{k}\) cannot fall any further and \(\ddot{c}\) immediately drops to \(f(0)\) and stay there hereafter.

Yet, this result does not in itself explain why the individual household will deviate from such a path. The individual household has a negligible
impact on the movement of \( \tilde{k}_t \) in society and correctly perceives \( r_t \) and \( w_t \) as essentially independent of its own consumption behavior. Indeed, the economy-wide \( \tilde{k} \) is not the household’s concern. What the household cares about is its own financial wealth and budget constraint. Nothing prevents the household from planning a negative financial wealth, \( a \), and possibly a continuously declining financial wealth, if only the NPG condition,

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} a_t e^{-\int_0^t (r_s - n)ds} \geq 0,
\]
is satisfied. But we can show that paths of type II will violate the NPG condition. The reasoning is as follows. The household plans to follow the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Given the expected evolution of \( r_t \) and \( w_t \) corresponding to path II, this will imply a planned gradual transition from positive financial wealth to debt. The transition to positive net debt, \( \tilde{d}_t \equiv -\tilde{a}_t \equiv -a_t/T_t > 0 \), takes place at time \( t_1 \) defined above.

The continued growth in the debt will meanwhile be so strong that the NPG condition is violated. To see this, note that the NPG condition implies the requirement

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{d}_t e^{-\int_0^t (r_s - g - n)ds} \leq 0, \tag{NPG}
\]
that is, the productivity-corrected debt, \( \tilde{d}_t \), is allowed to grow in the long run only at a rate less than the growth-corrected real interest rate. For \( t > t_1 \) we get from the accounting equation \( \dot{a}_t = (r_t - n)a_t + w_t - c_t \) that

\[
\dot{\tilde{d}}_t = (r_t - n - g)\tilde{d}_t + \tilde{c}_t - \tilde{w}_t > 0,
\]
where \( \dot{\tilde{d}}_t > 0 \), \( r_t > \rho + \theta g > g + n \), and \( \tilde{c}_t \) grows exponentially according to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, while \( \tilde{w}_t \) is non-increasing in that \( \tilde{k}_t \) does not grow. This implies

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\dot{\tilde{d}}_t}{\tilde{d}_t} \geq \lim_{t \to \infty} (r_t - n - g),
\]
which is in conflict with (NPG).

Consequently, the household will choose a lower consumption path and thus deviate from the expected path. All households would do the same and the evolution of \( r_t \) and \( w_t \) corresponding to path I is thus not an equilibrium with perfect foresight.

The conclusion is that all individual households understand that the only evolution which can be expected rationally is the one corresponding to the saddle path.

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D. A constant saving rate as a special case

As we noted in Section 7.4 Solow’s growth model can be seen as a special case of the Ramsey model, in that a constant saving rate may, under certain conditions, emerge as an endogenous result in the Ramsey model.

Let the rate of saving, \((Y_t - C_t)/Y_t\), be \(s_t\). We have generally

\[
\tilde{c}_t = (1 - s_t)f(\tilde{k}_t), \quad \text{and so} \quad (7.54)
\]

\[
\tilde{k}_t = f(\tilde{k}_t) - \tilde{c}_t - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_t = s_t f(\tilde{k}_t) - (\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_t. \quad (7.55)
\]

In the Solow model the rate of saving is a constant, \(s\), and we then get, by differentiating with respect to \(t\) in (7.54) and using (7.55),

\[
\frac{\dot{\tilde{c}}_t}{\tilde{c}_t} = f'(\tilde{k}_t)[s - \frac{(\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_t}{f(\tilde{k}_t)}]. \quad (7.56)
\]

By maximization of discounted utility in the Ramsey model, given a rate of time preference \(\rho\) and an elasticity of marginal utility \(\theta\), we get in equilibrium

\[
\frac{\dot{\tilde{c}}_t}{\tilde{c}_t} = \frac{1}{\theta}(f'(\tilde{k}_t) - \delta - \rho - \theta g). \quad (7.57)
\]

Generally, there will not be any constant, \(s\), such that the right-hand sides of (7.56) and (7.57), respectively, are the same for varying \(\tilde{k}\) (that is, outside steady state). But Kurz (1968a) showed the following:

CLAIM Let \(\delta, g, n, \alpha, \) and \(\theta\) be given. If the elasticity of marginal utility \(\theta\) is greater than 1 and the production function is \(\tilde{y} = A\tilde{k}^\alpha\) with \(\alpha \in (1/\theta, 1)\), then a Ramsey model with \(\rho = \theta\alpha(\delta + g + n) - \delta - \theta g\) will generate a constant saving rate \(s = 1/\theta\). Thereby the same resource allocation and transitional dynamics arise as in the corresponding Solow model with \(s = 1/\theta\).

Proof. Let \(1/\theta < \alpha < 1\) and \(f'(\tilde{k}) = A\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1}\). Then \(f'(\tilde{k}) = A\alpha\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1}\). The right-hand-side of the Solow equation, (7.56), becomes

\[
A\alpha\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1}[s - \frac{(\delta + g + n)\tilde{k}_t}{Ak^{\alpha}}] = sA\alpha\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha(\delta + g + n). \quad (7.58)
\]

The right-hand-side of the Ramsey equation, (7.57), becomes

\[
\frac{1}{\theta}A\alpha\tilde{k}^{\alpha-1} - \frac{\delta + \rho + \theta g}{\theta}.
\]

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By inserting $\rho = \theta \alpha(\delta + g + n) - \delta - \theta g$, this becomes

$$\frac{1}{\theta}A\alpha\hat{k}^{\alpha-1} - \frac{\delta + \theta \alpha(\delta + g + n) - \delta - \theta g + \theta g}{\theta} = \frac{1}{\theta}A\alpha\hat{k}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha(\delta + g + n). \quad (7.59)$$

For the chosen $\rho$ we have $\rho = \theta \alpha(\delta + g + n) - \delta - \theta g > n + (1 - \theta)g$, because $\theta \alpha > 1$ and $\delta + g + n > 0$. Thus, $\rho - n > (1 - \theta)g$ and existence of equilibrium in the Ramsey model with this $\rho$ is ensured. We can now make (7.58) and (7.59) the same by inserting $s = 1/\theta$. This also ensures that the two models require the same $k^*$ to obtain a constant $\hat{c} > 0$. With this $k^*$, the requirement $\hat{k}_t = 0$ gives the same steady-state value of $\hat{c}$ in both models, in view of (7.55). It follows that $(\hat{k}_t, \hat{c}_t)$ is the same in the two models for all $t \geq 0$. □

On the other hand, maintaining $\tilde{y} = A\hat{k}^\alpha$, but allowing $\rho \neq \theta \alpha(\delta + g + n) - \delta - \theta g$, so that $\theta \neq 1/s^*$, then $s'(\hat{k}) \neq 0$, i.e., the Ramsey model does not generate a constant saving rate except in steady state. Defining $s^*$ as in (7.38) and $\tilde{\theta} \equiv (\delta + \rho)/(\alpha(\delta + g + n) - g)$, we have: When $\alpha(\delta + g + n) > g$ (which seems likely empirically), it holds that if $\theta \lesssim 1/s^*$, i.e., if $\theta \lesssim \tilde{\theta}$, then $s'(\hat{k}) \lesssim 0$, respectively; if instead $\alpha(\delta + g + n) \leq g$, then $\theta < 1/s^*$ and $s'(\hat{k}) < 0$, unconditionally. These results follow by considering the slope of the saddle path in a phase diagram in the $(\hat{k}, \hat{c}/f(\hat{k}))$ plane and using that $s(\hat{k}) = 1 - \hat{c}/f(\hat{k})$, cf. Exercise 7.? The intuition is that when $\hat{k}$ is rising over time (i.e., society is becoming wealthier), then, when the desire for consumption smoothing is “high” ($\theta$ “high”), the prospect of high consumption in the future is partly taken out as high consumption already today, implying that saving is initially low, but rising over time until it eventually settles down in the steady state. But if the desire for consumption smoothing is “low” ($\theta$ “low”), saving will initially be high and then gradually fall in the process towards the steady state. The case where $\hat{k}$ is falling over time gives symmetric results.

E. The social planner’s solution

In the text of Section 7.5 we postponed some of the more technical details. First, by (A1), the existence of the steady state, $E$, and the saddle path in Fig. 7.1 is ensured. Solving the linear differential equation (7.44) gives $\lambda_t = \lambda_0 e^{-\int_0^t (\bar{f}(\hat{k}_s) - \delta - \theta g)ds}$. Substituting this into the transversality condition (8.47) gives

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-\int_0^t (\bar{f}(\hat{k}_s) - \delta - g - n)ds} \hat{k}_t = 0, \quad (7.60)$$
where we have eliminated the unimportant positive factor \( \lambda_0 = c_0^\hat{\theta} T_0 \). This condition is essentially the same as the transversality condition (7.35) for the market economy and holds in the steady state, \( E \), given the parameter restriction \( \hat{\rho} - n > (1 - \hat{\theta}) g \), which is satisfied in view of (A1). Thus, (7.60) also holds along the saddle path. Since we must have \( \hat{k} \geq 0 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \), (7.60) has the form required by Mangasarian’s sufficiency theorem. Thus, if we can show that the Hamiltonian is concave in \((\hat{k}, c)\) for all \( t \geq 0 \), then the saddle path is a solution to the social planner’s problem. And if we can show strict concavity, the saddle path is the only solution. We have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial H}{\partial \hat{k}} &= \lambda(f'(\hat{k}) - (\delta + g + n)), \\
\frac{\partial H}{\partial c} &= e^{-\hat{\theta}} - \lambda T, \\
\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial \hat{k}^2} &= \lambda f''(\hat{k}) < 0 \quad \text{(by } \lambda = e^{-\hat{\theta}} T > 0), \\
\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial \hat{k} \partial c} &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, the leading principal minors of the Hessian matrix of \( H \) are

\[
D_1 = -\frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial \hat{k}^2} > 0, \quad D_2 = \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial \hat{k}^2} \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial c^2} - \left( \frac{\partial^2 H}{\partial \hat{k} \partial c} \right)^2 > 0.
\]

Hence, \( H \) is strictly concave in \((\hat{k}, c)\), and the saddle path is the unique optimal solution.

It also follows that, as we stated, the transversality condition (8.47) is a necessary transversality condition. Note that we had to derive this conclusion in a different way than when solving the household’s consumption/saving problem in Section 7.2. There, we could appeal to Proposition 2 of the previous chapter to verify necessity of the transversality condition. But that proposition does not cover the social planner’s problem.

As to the diverging paths in Fig. 7.1, note that paths of type II (those paths which, as shown in Appendix C, in finite time deplete all capital) can not be optimal, in spite of the temporarily high consumption level. This follows from the fact that the saddle path is the unique solution. Finally, paths of type III in Fig. 7.1 behave as in (7.53) and thus violate the transversality condition (8.47), as claimed in the text.

### 7.9 Exercises