Thomas Jensen, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Formal models of politics, terrorism, and international relations. Applied game theory.
Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining (with Andreas Madum). Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming. [Early Online Version. Working paper]
National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision. Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(3): 530-554, April 2016. [Original publication. Working paper]
The Timing of Terrorist Attacks: An Optimal Stopping Approach. Research and Politics 3(1), February 2016. [Original Publication (open access). Working Paper]
Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17(5): 702-723, October 2015. [Original publication. Supporting Information. Working paper]
Exit Polls and Voter Turnout (with Asger Lau Andersen). Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(1): 117-134, January 2014. [Original publication. Working paper]
Optimal Counterterrorism and the Recruitment Effect of Large Terrorist Attacks: A Simple Dynamic Model. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1): 69-86, January 2011. [Original publication. Working paper]
Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition. Public Choice 141(1-2): 213-232, October 2009. [Original publication. Working paper]
Working Papers and Work in Progress
Does Better information Make War Less Likely? (with Allan Balsgaard). [Latest version]
Modeling the Effect of Democracy (with Thomas Markussen).
Fighting terrorism may actually increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Here’s how. The Monkey Cage, Washington Post, March 29, 2016.
Slides fra foredrag i UNF