Lecture 17:  
Lenders of last resort

We now move on to still another way of coping with bank runs and bank crises – actually we have already started the discussion with the Martin model. Although deposit insurance from a formal point of view is something which comes into play when the bank is already insolvent, its main function is to prevent that such things ever happen, at least to prevent that it happens just because of the beliefs of the depositors. Now we move to measures which can be taken when the bank run is becoming manifest: If the bank can obtain credits to survive with its problems for just a few days, the panic may well cease and the problem will disappear by itself. Unfortunately, other banks or private investors may be unwilling to lend money for this purpose (as we saw in chapter 14), so there should be some additional institution taking care of this, known as a lender of last resort.

The models of this chapter are designed to show that

1. lenders of last resort may fulfill a role which could not have been taken up by other institutions (such as deposit insurance), but
2. as always, this comes with some side effects which should not be neglected.
And

3. the final story of the chapter shows that lenders of last resort are in some sense necessary to the financial system – if they hadn’t been there, the banks themselves would create them (as they actually did in the US).

We have already considered the model in the first section, and we skip some of the material which follows, moving directly to Section 16.3 presenting the Ratnovski model of a world with two banks. The time span is as usual from $t = 0$ to $t = 2$, and in between, at $t = 1$, something happens which may give rise to a problem for the bank: The investment made at $t = 1$ turns out to demand additional outlays (it could be a building project, such things always happen there). If the bank has kept reserves for this, everything is well, but of course, this liquidity was not used for investment at $t = 0$, so the bank loses some potential earnings. If it had no reserves, it goes bankrupt if the liquidity event happens. With reasonable parameter values the banks will prefer to keep the liquid reserve.

Now a lender of last resort is introduced. However, this new institution will step in with a loan only if there is a real crisis, that is if both banks need liquidity (otherwise it probably assumes that the banks should solve their problems themselves). Moreover, it will assist only one bank. In this situation, what one bank does depends on what the other bank will do, so either both will be illiquid or both are liquid. From society’s
point of view, there is a welfare loss since for some parameter values both banks choose to be illiquid whereas they would have been liquid if there had been no lender of last resort.

It is fine if you read the first two pages (pp.317-318) where the model is set up and analyzed without a lender of last resort, and then skim quickly through p.319, where the formalism is less easily digested — and doesn’t improve things that I have made a typo in the text, explained on my homepage.

There is some confusion in the text on p.319, as explained in the comment on the course homepage. Sorry for that.

In Section 16.4 we consider a model which explains that lenders of last resort perform an important role, not only for society (preventing losses of deposits after bank runs) but also for the banks themselves, and they would create such a lender if it wasn’t there already.

In the model, banks are vulnerable to bank runs based on random signals in the market, since depositors may become afraid of not getting their money back. The signals have to do with the payoff of the bank’s investments which consists of two parts, one depending on general market conditions (observable) and on the bank (not observable to the depositor). Since depositors are pessimistic, they will assume that the bank part of the payoff is low. The reason that they want their money back is that the bank may commit fraud if payoffs are low, running away with the money and not paying back deposits, and to prevent this they want their money after having got the signal. The bank can prevent this only by having sufficient liquid reserves since the loss of these reserves will then be larger than the gain from committing fraud. Unfortunately, large reserves means the earnings are foregone.

If all the banks are merged into a single one consisting of many small branches, then the large bank can counteract the pessimism of the depositors by closing down and liquidate all branches with insufficient payoff, this act signals to the depositors that the remaining branches are sufficiently strong so that none of the local bank directors will commit fraud (and the model is such that liquidating a bank is no drama, every depositor gets the money back, only the investment payoffs are of course lost, but they were small anyway). The advantage of this policy is that the reserves which must be kept to convince depositors that no fraud is committed will be much smaller now.

Creating one bank (with the power to order liquidating of any branch) is smart in this respect, but it means that banking becomes a monopoly, and one would want to avoid this. But the banks could make a voluntary agreement with respect to liquidation of banks with bad investments. The banks which are asked to liquidate can do no better than following this suggestion, since otherwise there will be a run on them. But those banks which are not asked to liquidate but have rather small payoffs would be tempted to commit fraud if they were left to themselves, so the agreement
must also pertain to division of payoffs between banks, the banks with large payoffs compensating those with smaller payoffs, thereby making it more advantageous to follow the rules than to commit fraud. As a result, the coalition can keep reserves reasonably low, if not quite as low as if they had all merged into one bank. This profit-sharing arrangement can be seen as a liquidity transfer to banks which would otherwise have been subject to a run, so that the coalition acts as a lender of last resort.

The model is quite detailed, in particular the coalitional arrangement which has to take the form of voluntary participation. Our emphasis will be on the two first parts, discussing the case of many small banks and of a big bank, leaving the rest to more intuitive discussion.

**We read:** Chapter 16, rest.