Lecture 1: Introduction: Why Banks?

The present overview of the lecture is the first of a series of similar messages, which can be downloaded from the homepage at

web.econ.ku.dk/keiding/underv/bank

where they will appear some days before the lecture.

Since the lectures will be online at least in February and March, the outlines are expanded somewhat – online lectures tend to be shorter and much less instructive (and in addition they are even more boring) than face-to-face teaching, and therefore I have written down the main points of what we go through.

As outlined in the teaching plan (on the course homepage), we work ourselves through Chapter 1 of the book (we skip Section 5) in the course of this week, where we have lectures both Monday and Thursday. Usually, first lectures contain introductory bla-bla which can be passed over quickly, but in our case it so happens that the very first topics to be dealt are important and will be re-used repeatedly as we proceed, so it is preferable to get a grasp of what is going on.

As it can be seen from the teaching plan, we shall deal with two distinct – but of course related – topics in the course of the semester, namely

- Microeconomics of banking,
- Risk management in banks.

We shall proceed with the two topics in a somewhat parallel way, starting with the microeconomics part (which by the way is also the largest) and then introducing risk management in Lecture 3. So for the moment, we take the outsider’s viewpoint, trying to explain what is actually going on in the financial sector.

We begin with the typical academic question: Why are there banks? According to the standard way of understanding the functioning of an economy (general equilibrium theory) there is no need for banks! The story comes in the introduction to Chapter 1, and (as with most of what we shall be doing) it is simpler than it looks: We consider an economy over two periods (otherwise there would be no reason for savings and investment) which is as simple as possible, with only one consumption good in each period, and only one consumer, one producer, and a bank. There is no need for making it more complicated since the point can be made even here.

The consumer has an endowment now but wants also to consume in the next period, which means that saving is necessary, and this can be done either by purchase of bonds (which can issued by the firm or the bank and bought or sold in the market)
or leaving deposits with the bank which can be reclaimed next period. Since there are two ways of treating the savings, the consumer will choose the best, in particular the deposit rate cannot be smaller than the bond rate, if the bank is to be used.

Turn then to the producer, who borrows to get inputs and sells the output in the next period. There are two ways of borrowing, namely issue of bonds and bank loans. Again, the loan rate cannot exceed the bond rate, since otherwise there would be no loans.

It remains then to check the bank which is funded by bonds issue and deposits, and earns money on the differences between loan rate and deposit rate. Under the above conditions the deposit rate and the loan rate must equal the bond rate, so profits are 0 and the bank just mimics the bond market and can just as well be left out.

What this shows is not that there are no banks out there, clearly there are. It tells us that there are some phenomena left out in our equilibrium model, which explains that banks are there and earn money. The most obvious of these phenomena is asymmetric information in some form. We therefore consider four possible explanations, all of which contain asymmetric information in some disguise. Notice that each explanation contains of thee parts, namely

(i) an outline of the special type of business considered,

(ii) an explanation of why the ordinary money market cannot cope with the situation, at least not in a satisfactory way,

(iii) a demonstration that a suitably designed financial intermediary can improve on the situation.

We treat the first one here, postponing the three others to the next lecture.

The first one treated is that of liquidity insurance, where we present the almost-classical Diamond-Dybvig model. It was conceived as a background for explaining bank panics, where banks need to pay out more money to their depositors than they actually have, a recurrent problem for banking. We shall return to this at a much later stage, at present we use the model only to show how the fundamental business model of banking (taking deposits at a low rate, lending out at a high rate) can be given a rational foundation.

In the model, we have potential investors (many of them) who are all identical, having one unit of money which can be invested to give an outcome $R > 1$ after two periods. They are however subject to a liquidity shock after 1 period, this happens independently and with probability $\pi$ for each individual. If they want back their investment at this early stage, they get only $L < 1$.

With no intercourse between individuals, each investor must choose the amount $I$ to invest, leaving the rest for the case where liquidity is needed. This is not a very smart solution, it can be improved if the people hit by a liquidity shock sell their investments (titles to outcome at date 2) to those not hit by a liquidity shock. What
comes out of it depends of course on the price of such second-hand investments, but it can easily be argued that the price must equal $1/R$. With this price it is seen that the investors will get 1 back if impatient and receive $R$ if they turn out to be patient.

However, this is not the best possible solution. If the investors go together and make a joint decision on the amount to be invested, then the community can reimburse the impatient (which amount to the share $\pi$ of all investors by the law of large numbers) with what was not invested and pay the remaining fraction of investors the outcome of what was invested. As we nowadays dislike the idea of having the community and society take decisions on behalf of its members, we may instead implement this arrangement by collecting all the money of the investor as a deposit in a “bank” which then is contractually obliged to pay out the reimbursement to the impatient (and this turns out to be $> 1$), as well as the investment outcome (which now is somewhat smaller than $R$) to the patient investors. Since investors are assumed to be risk averse, they are happy with this contract, it is better than what they could get using the market.

The optimal contract is such that impatient get slightly less than patient investors, so there would be no point in pretending to be impatient at date 1 if this was not the case. Thus, there is no need for bureaucratic documentation of liquidity needs, you just say that you want your money, and then you get it.

Just to run ahead of our story, this may fail if we introduce beliefs (which so far played no role). Suppose that for some reason (wait for a split-second to consider this ‘reason’), the patient investors are afraid at date 1 that they would not get their money at date 2. Then they would accept the smaller amount designated for impatient investors rather than getting nothing, so they show up as impatient. Clearly, the bank cannot pay all its investors, so it goes bankrupt (and it turns out the pessimistic patient investors were right). This is how a bank run may evolve, and we return to it in Chapter 14.

**We read:**

Chapter 1, Sections 1 – 3.

There is a number of exercises in the book at the end of each chapter, some suggestions to their answers can be found on the course homepage. They are not necessarily of the same type as the questions which will occur at the exam (we shall return to this on several occasions, so don’t worry now), and you may consider these exercises as a support for your reading of the text – or you may skip them altogether.