Hans Keiding

Research


Game Theory

Social Choice

General equilibrium

Health Economics

Teaching


Economics

Textbooks


Economics of Banking
  Game Theory

Health Economics

General Equilibrium Theory



Latest revision:

29.07.2024
Hans Keiding


Teaching autumn 2024:

History of Economic Thought

In this course we look at the ways in which the economic activity in society has been understood and explained over the last three hundred years. The purpose of studying theories and methods which have been rejected, improved or perhaps just forgotten, is to get a better understanding of contemporary economic problems and their interpretation.


Teaching spring 2024:

Economics of Banking

In this course we cover the microeconomic theory of banking, that is the interaction of bank with depositors, borrowers and other banks, and with risk management, one of the central aspects of banking. We also touch upon some recent phenomena such as cryptocurrencies and money laundering.

Taken together, this opens up for a discussion of of regulation of financial intermediaries.


Research project

Equilibria in economics with real assets

The paper deals with existence of (pseudo-)equilibrium in an economy with real assets. Its results extents the conditions known from the literature, and it uses an alternative method, based on a parametrization of the set of subspaces of the commodity space, the so-called Grassmannians.


Research project

The capability approach to health state measurement

The concept of capabilities introduced by Amartya Sen captures the options open to an individual rather than actual achievement. Despite of its considerable intuitive appeal there have been few practical applications. We investigate in an whether this is connected with the difficulties of formalizing an index measuring the extent of individual capabilities.


Research project

Towards a formal theory of delegation and compromises (w. J.Abdou)

We consider an abstract situation of a political contest, where agents (who can themselves be coalitions of individuals) must form a collective body for decision making in a large variety of situations, and where cases of incompatibility of viewpoints must not occur. To mitigate such cases of instability, agents may delegate power to representatives, thereby reducing the possibility of a stalemate.

The combinatorial structure of the political structure matters for the possibility of achieving a stable collective body, a compromise, through delegation. To characterize such structures, we use homotopy theory of finite topological spaces.







 

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CV

Publications