Research
| Game Theory | |
| Social Choice | |
| General equilibrium | |
| Health Economics |
Teaching
| Economics |
Textbooks
| Economics of Banking | |
| Game Theory | |
| Health Economics | |
| General Equilibrium Theory |
Latest revision:
1.1.2025
Hans Keiding
In this course we cover the microeconomic theory of banking, that is the interaction of bank with depositors, borrowers and other banks, and with risk management, one of the central aspects of banking. We also touch upon some recent phenomena such as cryptocurrencies and money laundering.
Taken together, this opens up for a discussion of regulating financial intermediaries.
Teaching autumn 2024:
History of Economic Thought
In this course we look at the ways in which the economic activity in society has been understood and explained over the last three hundred years. The purpose of studying theories and methods which have been rejected, improved or perhaps just forgotten, is to get a better understanding of contemporary economic problems and their interpretation.
Research project
Equilibria in economics with real assetsThe paper deals with existence of (pseudo-)equilibrium in an economy with real assets. Its results extents the conditions known from the literature, and it uses an alternative method, based on a parametrization of the set of subspaces of the commodity space, the so-called Grassmannian.
Research project
The capability approach to health state measurement
The concept of capabilities introduced by Amartya Sen captures the options open to an individual rather than actual achievement. Despite of its considerable intuitive appeal there have been few practical applications. We investigate in an whether this is connected with the difficulties of formalizing an index measuring the extent of individual capabilities.
Research project
We consider an abstract situation of a political contest, where agents (who can themselves be coalitions of individuals) must form a collective body for decision making in a large variety of situations, and where cases of incompatibility of viewpoints must not occur. To mitigate such cases of instability, agents may delegate power to representatives, thereby reducing the possibility of a stalemate.
The combinatorial structure of the political structure matters for the possibility of achieving a stable collective body, a compromise, through delegation. To characterize such structures, we use homotopy theory of finite topological spaces.
